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ABSTRACT 
A general nonlinear l ogit model is used to analyze pol i tical 
ch oice data. The model a s sume s probabil istic voting based on a 
spa tial uti l ity functi on. The parame ters of the uti l ity function and 
the spatial coordinates of the choice s and the ch oosers can a l l  be 
e st imated on the basis of ob served ch oices. Ordinary Gut tman scal ing 
is a de generate case of th i s  model. Estimation of th e model is 
implemented in the NOMINATE program for one dimensional analysis of 
two al ternative ch oices with no nonvoting. The robustne s s  and face 
validity of th e program output s are evaluated on the basis o f  roll 
call voting data for the U. S. Sena t e ,  1 97 9- 81 . Extensive Monte Carlo 
studies are also pre sented. Sub s t antive appl ications using the 
resul t s  for th e S enate are briefly il lustrated. 
A SPATIAL MODEL FOR LEGISLATIVE ROLL CALL ANALYSIS 
Ke ith Pool e  and Howard Rosenthal• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One way to try to account for pol it i cal choices i s  t o  imagine that 
e a ch ch ooser occup i e s  a fixe d posi tion in a space of one or more 
dimens ions , and to suppo se th at every choice pre sent e d  to h im is a 
ch oice b e tween two or more points in that space • • •  
One of th e most difficult problems of def ining dimensions 
in th i s  way centers about the operational de f inition of distance • 
• • Scales of the sort we h ave use d  • • • appear to de f ine only an 
ordering rel ation rather than an interval s c.ale  • • • •  The 
def inition of distance therefore marks a crucial gap b e tween the 
model we sh all propose and the data we have presented. 
MacRae (195 8 ,  pp. 3 55-56)  
Th is e s say bridges MacRae' s "crucial g ap. " Using sol ely th e 
nominal data of observed pol itical choi c e s ,  we are abl e  to e stimate 
metric spatial distance s. We pre sent our methodology in the context 
of l e g i sl ative roll call analysis. The se methods also apply to the 
analysis of voting in popul ar e l e ctions and other forms of pol itical 
choice behavior when the ch oice s e t  is a f inite set of alternatives. 
Conse quently, we develop the analysis with more general ity th an 
nec e s sary for our il lustrative examp l e ,  an analysis of rol l call 
voting in the U.S. S enate from 1979 through 1981. 
Th e individual s  making the pol it i cal ch oices can be e i ther 
voters or l e g i s l ators. Typical ch oice s e ts would be {Ye a ,  Nay} , for 
the U. S. Congre s s ,  {Carter, Ford, Did Not Vote} , for the 197 6 
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Pre sident i al el ect ion, {Extreme Le f t ,  Communist, Soc ial ist Federation, 
Center, Independent Republ ican, Gaul l is t ,  Extreme Right,  Bl ank or 
Spoi led Ballot, Abs tent ion} ,  for French elections in the 1960s. 
A l ong-standing [ e. g. , Rice (1924) ] re. se arch method i s  t o  
create a n  Euc l idean representation of e i ther the choices o r  the 
individuals. Various methods, such as factor analysis and nonm e tric 
scaling, have been applied in an e ssent i a l ly b l ack box,  stati s t i ca l-
method driven fash ion. For roll c a l l  exampl e s ,  see Weisberg (1968) 
and Warwick (197 7 ) . 1 
Over a decade ago , re searchers began to rea l i z e  th a t ,  if 
ch oice beh avior i s  cons istent with the e l ementary mul tidimensional 
spatial model (Davis et al. , 1970) , th e se b l ack-box methods would 
inaccurately recover th e true Euc l idean coordinates. At that t ime, 
almost all work was based e i ther upon l e g i sl ator-by-legislator 
analysis or roll cal l-by-roll call analy s i s. In e i ther case , measures 
of association, such a s  Yul e ' s  Q or d/d , were input fodder to the max 
b l ack box procedure s. 
As to l e g i sl a tor-by-legisl ator analy s i s ,  Morri son ( 1972) 
pointe d  out that th e most accepted methods were a l l  based on the 
proportion of the total vot e s  on wh ich two l e g i sl ators disagreed. 
Morrison showed th at the proportion of disagreement can serve ne ith er 
as a measure of angle nor as one of dist ance. 2 S ince the bl ack boxe s 
a s sume th eir input is e i ther distanc e s  or ang l e s ,  they are unl ikely to 
recover the " true" Euc l idean space. 
Independently, We i sberg ( 1968) pre sented a discus s i on similar 
to Morrison's and a l so covered rol l cal l-by-roll call analysis. In 
addition, Weisberg addressed how error would affect the bl ack box 
methods. In an e rrorl e s s  world, a l e g i sl ator will always vote , in 
spatial terms , for th e closest alternative , as suming s incere vot ing. 
That i s ,  the legisl ator vot e s  for the alternative with high e st 
ut i l i ty. But suppo se th ese ut i l i t i e s  are subj ect to error (perh aps 
from perceptual error or from omitted, idiosyncratic dimensions ) ,  so 
that the l e g i sl ator no l onger always choose s the closest a l ternative. 
In that c a s e ,  c i ting an abundant psychometric l iterature , Wei sberg 
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shows that the b l ack box methods will general ly find a space with more 
dimensions than "truly" exi st. 
Th e problems that Weisberg and Morrison pointed out with the 
various mul tidimensional "bl ack box" procedur e s  also occur with 
Guttman scal ing , a procedure even more widely used by pol itical 
scient i s t s. To see th e relationship of Guttman scal ing to spatial 
analys i s ,  first a ssume a one- dimensional space where th e Yea and Nay 
alternatives are points on the continuum. 3 Assume further that each 
l e g i slator vote s for the a l ternative closest to h i s  ideal point. In 
th is case,  th e " cutting point" equidistant from th e al ternative s for 
each roll call will divide th e l e g i sl ators into " left" and "right" 
camp s ,  and one obtains a perfect Guttman scale. In such a case,  we 
can never hope to learn anyth ing about the spat i al posit ion of 
l e g i s lation s ince a l l  pairs of alternatives with the same cutting 
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point generate the same roll call behavior. We can, at least 
ordinally, identify the cutting point s, but we can never, in th i s  
perfect world, learn wh ere the alternatives are. Hopeful ly, the 
strong behavioral a s sumptions underlying Guttman scal ing will not hold 
in practice, and there will be some error in the ch oices. Somewh at 
paradoxi cal ly, we nee d  error to learn about the loca tion of 
al ternat ives. 
Now if th ere is error but only one " true" dimension and we 
ins ist upon Guttman scaling [or r e l ated t e chniques such as MacRae' s 
( 1970) Q- cluster analysis] not a l l  the roll cal l s  will form a s ingle 
scale. In fact, a s  acknowledged by Clausen ( 1967 , p. 1023 ) in h i s  
di scus s i on of Lingoe s Mul t ipl e S calogram Analys i s ,  w e  might wel l  find 
several scales and conclude th at there are mul tiple dimensions or 
i s sue areas wh en in fact only one exi sts. 
When the true space is mul tidimensional , Guttman s ca l ing will 
also exaggerate dimensiona l i ty for anoth er reason. To see th i s ,  
consider a two-dimensional space wh ere choice i s  again without error 
and l e g i slators vote for th e closest alternative. Now "Yea" and "Nay" 
voters are separated by a cutting l ine , the perpendicular b i se ctor of 
the l ine j oining the two alterna tive s. Draw any l ine through the 
space. All rol l cal l s  with cutting l ine s perpendicular to th i s  l ine 
will form a perfect Guttman scale. These roll calls  will general ly 
not scale with rol l  cal l s  th at are not perpendicular to the l ine. As 
we try a vari e ty of l ine s, we may f ind many Gut tman s ca l e s ,  al though 
th e space is only two-dimensional. Wh en we h ave both error and 
mul t idimens ional ity, we h ave two effects that cause ordinary Guttman 
scaling to exaggerate the true dimensional ity. 
s 
To summarize th e prece eding discus sion, th e mul tivariate bl ack 
box methods are not based upon a spa tial model of choice wh ile 
ordinary Guttman scal ing i s  based on a very l imited model. 
Consequently, it is not surpri s ing th at traditional analyse s often 
h ave to segregate th e data by pol itical party ( MacRa e ,  195 8 ,  1967 ) , 
thus ob s curing an overall picture of the l e g i s lature, or f ind a 
rel atively large numb e r  of dimensions (Clausen, 197 3 ) .  
Wh i l e  helping us to unde rstand the pe rils of b l ack boxe s ,  
Wei sberg ( 1968) took a "least evil" approach i n  h i s  dis sertation. He 
sought to f ind wh ich input s woul d cause the fewe st problems to the 
b l ack boxe s. In contrast, in his seminal piece,  Morrison be gan the 
que st for a procedure th at would be model-driven. By a model-driven 
procedure ,  we mean one that begins with a model of individual choice 
behavior, draws the implications of the model for how such observed 
data a s  roll c a l l  vot e s  w i l l  be generated, and then develop methods 
for recovering the unknown Eucl ide an coordina tes from the observed 
data in a manner that i s  cons i st ent with the underlying ch oice model. 
Morrison' s approach was based upon very re stri ctive a ssumpt ions , such 
as error free ch oice and a symme tric distribution of cutting l ine s ,  
and w a s  not followed b y  empirical appl ications. 
In contrast to a l l  of th ese earlier approach e s ,  we h ere 
develop methods that derive from th e basic spatial model of ch oice , 
allow for error, and make no a s sumptions regarding the distribution of 
e i ther legislator ideal point s or th e Eucl idean coordinates of 
alternat ives. Like the earl ier analyse s ,  we a s sume that the 
observations are independent across individual s  and over time and 
th at, on e ach roll cal l ,  s incere ( in the usual sense of nonstrat e g i c )  
voting prevail s. Based on a model of probabil i s t i c  voting akin to 
Cough l in ( 19 83 )  and Hinich ( 1977 ) , our procedure s  permit s imul taneous 
re covery of the Eucl ide an coordinates of both indiv idual s  and choic e s  
and the parameters of a ut il ity function f o r  the individual s. ( In 
contrast,  most convent ional approach e s  do not place th e choi ce s or 
ch oosers in a common space. ) In p sychome tric parlance , we h ave 
developed an unfold ing methodology for nominal level data. 
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Substantively, what might appear to be the key l imitation of 
our procedures i s  the s incere voting a s sumption. Whi l e  whether the 
a s sumption is a l imitation is partly an empirical que stion, there are 
th eoreti cal rea sons to downpl ay strate g i c  voting. First, rol l cal l s  
a r e  i n  the pub l i c  record. If a l e g i sl ator' s ut il ity on a b i l l  derives 
from the interests of some of his const ituent s ,  it will be diff icul t 
to oppose those interests even if doing so will eventual ly favor other 
interests. S econd, as Fiorina ( 1974) has argued, th e sub stant i al 
uncertaint i e s  in l e g i s l ative agendas l e aves comm itments on future 
vot e s  as h ighly tenuous contracts. 
Methodologically ,  our procedure s  rely on e st imation of a 
stoch astic ut i l i ty function by th e polytomous logit methods pionee re d  
b y  McFadden ( 1974) . Unl ike standard logit mode l s ,  however ,  the 
spa tial mode l ,  as we sh all show bri efly, inherently ne ce ssitates 
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nonlinear estimation. Such estimation h as been proh ib i t ively 
expensive for l arge data sets,  but recent and ant i cipated developments 
in computer technology now make nonlinear maximum l ikel ihood 
e st imation an affordab l e  procedur e .  
W e  continue our pre sentation with a formal devel opment o f  our 
stat i s t i cal model in S ection II. Next, in Section III, we discus s ,  in 
terms of our one-dimensional impl ementation, a variety of th eoret i ca l  
issue s  th at a r i s e  i n  e stimation of th e mode l .  Then, i n  S e c t ion r:v, we 
pre sent NOMINATE, wh ich pe rform s unidimensional nominal unfolding . 
This is followed, in S e ct ion V, by an inve stigation of the robustne ss 
of the procedures with actual Senate roll call data. The content of 
the recovered coordinates i s  discus sed in S ection VI. Monte Carlo 
studies are pre sented in S e ct ion VII .  Fina l ly ,  Section VIII briefly 
mentions substantive appl ications . 
II. THE MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 
We denote p indiv idual s  ( legislator s )  by generic index i, r 
ch oice sets ( roll c a l l s )  by index t ,  and qt alternat ives in choice set 
t by index j .  Henceforth ,  unl e s s  otherwise stated, we develop the 
analysis for a single individual making a s ingl e  choice and omit 
indic e s  t and i .  Th e  summations over individua l s  and ch oice sets are 
usually obvious. 
Abstent i on or nonvot ing require s spe c i al treatment. Wh en such 
a ch oice is feasib l e ,  we adopt the convent ion that i t  has index q .  
The number of pol icy alterna tive s i s  denoted by q* . Wh en abstention 
is feasib l e, q* q-1 ;  oth erwise,  q* q. 
Basic Assumptions 
(Al )  Each individual is a s sumed to h ave an interval l evel uti l i ty 
function def ined over th e elements of the ch oice set.  Th e ut i l i ty i s  
compo sed o f  a random component ej and a f ixed component uj . S o ,  we 
write 
U. J Uj + E j 
We may most conveniently think of e. as a spe cif ication error J 
by the pol imetri c i an, ej be ing uncorrel ated with uj. 
(A2 )  Each stochastic disturbance e. i s: J 
( i) independent of th e disturbanc e s  for other indiv idual s  and 
ch oice s e t s .  E ( etij et'i'j' ) = 0 ,  i F i '  or t 
F t' 
( i i) for the same individual ,  E(et .. e t .. , ) = 0 ,  j F j ' .  1J 1J 
( i ii)  e ach e. is distributed as the log of the inverse of J 
an exponent ially di stributed r andom variab l e .  
Assumpt ions A l  and A2 ( i) a r e  standard. They are obviously 
inappropriate if th ere is substant ial strateg i c  vot ing. Even when 
voting is s incer e ,  th e assumptions may not be appropriate. For 
exampl e ,  disturbance s are l ikely to be correlated across roll cal l s  
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when there are a number of vot e s  in the same substantive area ( e . g . , a 
sequence of amendment s deal ing with Federal funding of abortions ) .  
9 
S imil arly. disturbanc e s  may be correlated across legislators ( e. g  • •  
the two Democratic S enators from Georgi a  are l ikely to exh ibit s imil ar 
"disturbanc e s " ) .  For tractabil ity. we must rely on the standard 
a ssumptions. 
Assumption A2 ( i i i )  is known a s  the a s sumption of the logit 
(Weibul l )  distribution. This distribution close ly resembles the 
normal and i t s  use is without maj or consequence for the type of 
empiri cal work di scus s e d  h ere. Assumpt ion A2 ( i i )  is more critical,  as 
we sh all see sh ortly. 
Def ine 
c. 
J 
1 if alternative j is chosen 
0 oth erwise 
(A3) S inc ere Voting. 
c. 
J 
1 if Uj > Uk for a l l  k F j 
0 oth erwise,  4 
Thus , we cons ider only th e case where vot ing i s  s ince re. The 
voter or legislator always choose s the alternative with h igh e st 
ut i l i ty. If voter s  determine th eir partic ipation de c i s ion on the 
basis of wh e ther th eir vote "make s a difference , "  the methods 
presente d  h ere are inappropri ate in th eir basic structure in addit ion 
to the assumpt i ons on errors. Log-rol l ing across b i l l s  would pre sent 
a simil ar problem. 
Assumptions Al, A2, and A3 imply that ( se e ,  e. g. , Dhrymes. 
197 8 ,  p. 3 47 )  
Pr{cj 
wh ere 
bl 
1} 
q 
�1 
u. 
e J /w 
u. 
e J 
Note th at ( 1 )  is mute as to wh e th e r  individual s  actua l ly 
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( 1 )  
randomize i n  making choices. Th e only important consideration i s  that 
ch oice " l ooks" to be probab il istic from the viewpoint of the 
pol imetr i c i an. 
Note furth er that th e odds that one alternative i s  ch osen 
relative to anoth er depend only on a pairwise compari son of f ixed 
ut il ities and are " independent of irrel evant a l ternatives." That i s ,  
Pr{ci 1} 
Pr{ ck 1} 
u. 
� 
Uk e 
( 2 )  
I n  general , th i s  independence i s  a l imitation of the model. a s  
seen b e l ow. 
Evaluation of the Model's Predict ions 
Assume the f ixed component s u .. have b e en spe c i f ied. How can 1J 
we evaluate the model? Th e l ikel ihood of an observed ch oice for an 
individual is given by: 
Lti 
t q 
Il Pr{ctij j=l 
c 
l} tij 
The total .!..Q.&-likelihood follows from ( 1 )  and ( 3 )  as [ t r P q 
l 
= b1 �l f:1 '<•J.tij - t, 1u .. .  ]
11 
( 3 )  
( 4 )  
Obviously, the log-likelihood is increased when the utility of 
the actual choice increases or the utility of any other choice 
decreases: 
u. 
&= c. - el/w auj J 
(5) 
The log-likelihood statistic itself, while useful for certain 
hypothesis tests, is not useful as a descriptive statistic. It can be 
transformed into a useful summary statistic as the geometric mean 
probability of the actual choices: 
p = el /p 
It should be noted that P is a "conservative" statistic and is always 
less than the mean probability of the actual choices.5 It "penalizes" 
actual choices with low probabilities. 
In addition to examining P as a summary of probabilities, in 
our application to binary choice, we also look at the percentage of 
choices correctly "predicted" by a maximum probability approach. 6 
This is just the percentage of the choices for which individuals 
choose the closer of the two alternatives.7 
A. Spatial Model of Utility 
As a model for the u., we use a spatial model. Both J 
individuals and policy alternatives are represented as points in an 
appropriately normalized Euclidean space.8 The fixed component of 
12 
utility, in turn, depends solely on distance, or for convenience, its 
square: 
u. J f(d�). f'(") � 0 J 
Examination of ( 6) discloses why independence of irrelevant 
alternatives A2(ii) is a strong assumption. Assume there are 
( 6)  
initially two choices in a one-dimensional setup, one located at the 
-1 coordinate and the other at +l. Consider an individual at the 
origin, O. This individual will make each choice with equal 
probability by ( 6) and ( 2 ) .  With no abstention, the probability will 
be ¥3. Assume another choice is added at -1. All alternatives now 
have probability 1/3. In some contexts, however, one might prefer a 
model where the single alternative at +l was chosen with probability 
1/2 and each alternative at -1 with probability 1/4. This issue need 
not be dealt with in terms of our present application to a dichotomous 
choice set {Yea, Nay}. For further discussion and suggested 
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alternative models, see Amemiya (1981). 
Using A2 in conjunction with ( 6) simplifies estimation 
considerably. We note immediately from (1) that adding a constant to 
all utilities does not change the choice probabilities. Hence, we 
can, without loss of generality, fix the utility of nonvoting at 0. 
So, 
u q 0, for q• q-1 (7) 
A very useful restriction in the spatial model represented by 
( 6) and (7) is that the utility of a policy alternative depends only 
upon that alternative's distance and not on any other distance. 
Therefore, the log-likelihood responds to changes in d. solely through J 
changes in u. : J 
_il_ - _il_ 
ad� 
- auj J 
au. --1 
ad� J 
Functional Specification of Utility 
The functional form we employ for utility of policy 
alternatives is: 
a + p e u. J 
-·ir2d2 __i 
2 j � q• 
This function generalizes the familiar, bell-shaped unit-
normal. The function is the unit normal when a = 0, w = 1, and 
( 8) 
(9) 
P = 1/,/2;. Six examples are shown in Figure 1. We have selected (9) 
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for several reasons: 
1. Our substantive intuition is that political actors are relatively 
insensitive to small changes in distance from their ideal points; 
at somewhat greater distances, utility should change sharply; 
finally, at very great distances, changes in distance should have 
little effect on utility. Quasi-concave utility functions such as 
(9) have in fact been posited by spatial theorists. [See Riker 
and Ordeshook (1973).] 
2. The ability to vary both w and P provides considerable 
flexibility. When nonvoting is not in the choice set, the 
parameter a cannot be identified and is set to zero. In this 
case, the range of u .. is (0, p], sop sets the maximum utility 1J 
while w controls how fast utility falls with increases in 
distance.9 This can be seen in Figure 1 by comparing the 
functions with equal P values. 
Without loss of generality, we can constrain all 
individual coordinates to have magnitudes less than a certain 
predetermined number. By varying the parameters p and w, we can 
obtain a variety of shapes for the utility function. Thus, 
between -1 and 1, the functions shown in Figure 1 range from a 
bell-shape to a parabolic shape. 
[Figure 1 here] 
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3 .  The function enables us to capture nonvoting from alienation. 
[Although nonvoting does not appear to have substantive importance 
in Congress, it is important in many European legislatures and the 
United Nations.] When nonvoting is possible, the parameter a must 
be included in the model. As d. � �. this second term in (9) J 
approaches zero. If voting persisted as all alternatives become 
distant, perhaps by a sense of "citizen duty," we would have to 
have a > 0 to allow for this behavior. If, on the other hand, 
voting was viewed as costly and voters abstained for u. J 
sufficiently small, we would need a < O. In summary, if all 
stochastic terms are zero, the voter will always select the 
"closest" choice, provided this choice has positive utility. 
Consequently, this model represents the nonvoting from alienation 
model proposed by Hinich and Ordeshook (1969) and, even more 
directly, the probabilistic extension in Hinich et al. (1972). As 
shown in Poole and Rosenthal (1982), our model can readily be 
extended to handle nonvoting from indifference. 
Identification 
If a and P are the only unknown parameters, (7) and (9) in 
fact give us a linear logit model. In such models, the coefficients 
are typically identified only up to an additive constant. Thus, we 
essentially identified a by arbitrarily setting uq = O. Atypically, p 
is identified in this model. The nonlinearity serves to identify w. 
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The parameters would still be identified if a separate a., p., J J 
and wj were estimated for each choice. The Pj are still identified 
because, in the equation for choice j, the model constrains to zero 
-w2d2 
__ k 
the coefficient on e 2 ' k I= j. The model can be estimated with and 
without the restriction that the coefficients are equal across 
equations. The results can be compared as a test of the sincere 
voting model. When strategic-voting is suspected, dropping the 
restriction may well result in a substantial improvement in fit.10 
Distance 
The distance for a one-dimensional model is calculated as: 
d� J (x - z.)
2 
J 
where x is the coordinate of the individual and z. that of the J 
(10) 
alternative. In some applications, the x and z may be taken as known. 
For example in a mass voting context, the x and z may result from 
scaling survey thermometers (Cahoon et al. [1978), Rabinowitz [1976, 
1978), Poole [1978), Wang et al. [1975), Poole and Rosenthal [1982)). 
In other cases, only the x may be known. For example, the scaling of 
interest group ratings by Poole (1981) and Poole and Daniels (1982) 
gives x for members of Congress but not the locations of the roll 
calls, the z. In other cases, both x and z may be unknown. This is 
the case of pure nominal unfolding, when one seeks to "bootstrap" the 
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analysis solely from the observation of choices. Obviously, to 
estimate x accurately, r must be "large" and to estimate z, p must be 
large. This will be the case in roll call analysis; our examples will 
have p = 100 and r > 300. For mass voting, if we wish to base 
unfolding on observed or reported choices rather then thermometers, 
only the z can be estimated. 
Multidimensional Generalization 
The above discussion has a straightforward generalization to 
an s-dimensional space. We index the dimensions by k. 
We now write 
d: J 
s s 
[ 
\ akk' (xk - z "k)(xk, - z "k') k=l kf;;l J J 
where, for example, � is the individual's coordinate on the k-th 
dimension and the akk, are Davis-Hinich saliency weights (Davis et 
al., 1970). 
In some applications, it may be useful to estimate the a 
weights as an alternative to assuming that the dimensions are 
orthogonal and of equal salience. One can, without loss of 
(11) 
generality, set a11 = 1. This and symmetry imply that there are only 
s(s + 1)/2 - 1 independent a weights. 
One clear situation where the a should be estimated is when 
one constructs the space from a set of unidimensional issue scalings 
[e.g., via the Aldrich-McKelvey (1977) method]. Another situation is 
when one seeks to test the veracity of a metric unfolding. In this 
1 8 
case, finding nonorthogonal dimensions or unequal saliences from the 
choice data would cause one to question the unfolding. Whenever the a 
are estimated, they should be checked to see if they define a positive 
definite matrix; if not, the Euclidean model should be questioned. 
To estimate the parameters, one can apply a gradient procedure 
to maximize the log-likelihood (4). Two basic derivatives have 
already been given in (5) and ( 8) .  As a result, we can compute the 
gradients, using the chain rule, by obtaining the partial derivatives 
of u. with respect to the parameters of the utility function and of d: J J 
with respect to the xi' zj, and a. These are, for j i q*, 
auij 
ad:. 1J 
au .. __!J_ 
aa 1 
2 
!'L [u .. - a] 2 1J 
au .. __!J_ 
ap 
1 
ii [uij - a] 
au .. __!J_ 
a w  
2 -wdij [ uij - a] 
ad:. s 
__!J_ = 2 
[ axik k'=l 
ad:. s 
__!J_ = -2 
[ a zjk k'=l 
( - z • ) akk, xik' jk 
( - z • ) akk, xik' jk 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
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ad:. 
__ll = 
aakk 
2 (xik - zjk) ( 19) 
ad:. 
___.!J_ = 2(x.k - z. k)(xik' - zjk') k' � k aakk, 1 J 
(20) 
III. THE ONE DIMENSIONAL MODEL: THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF ESTIMATION 
In this paper, we implement the estimation for dichotomous 
choice in one dimension with no nonvoting. By convention, we 
designate the lesser of the two z as the "liberal" or "left" 
coordinate. We now discuss several issues that arise in estimation. 
Perfect Roll Calls 
Assume every individual to the left of a certain point on the 
dimension voted yea and every individual to the right of this point 
voted nay. As mentioned in the Introduction, we will be able to 
identify midpoints but not outcome locations for such "errorless" 
voting. 
If we observe a set of perfect or near perfect roll call 
responses and attempt to estimate outcome locations for fixed 
legislator locations and a fixed, stochastic utility function, we will 
estimate a midpoint corresponding to a Guttman scale cutting line. 
Where will we place the liberal coordinate? Clearly, we will not 
place it close to the midpoint since all legislators would then be 
predicted to vote yea with probability O.S. Similarly, we will not 
place the liberal outcome far to the left of the leftmost legislator. 
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In that case, the conservative outcome would be far to the right, and, 
given the functional form of our utility function, all legislators 
would be close to indifferent between these two distant alternatives 
and would vote yea with probabilities near O.S. So we will get an 
intermediate outcome. However, a range of intermediate outcomes will 
give similar predictions, and we will not be able to recover the 
liberal outcome. 
Unanimous Roll Calls 
Unanimous roll calls are a special case of perfect roll calls. 
With unanimity, the cutting line must clearly lie outside the range of 
the legislators. In this case, even the midpoint cannot be located 
precisely. If the winning alternative were deemed "liberal," our 
estimation technique would put the liberal alternative near the 
centroid of the legislators and attempt to put the midpoint at 
infinity. To avoid such senseless estimates, we eliminate unanimous 
and near unanimous votes from the analysis. 
Random Roll Calls and Extreme Placements 
Assume, on a given roll call, the yea and nay alternatives 
were identical. Then, in our model, legislators would be effectively 
flipping coins to make vote decisions. Moreover, any "converged" 
outcome locations would lead to this behavior. Conversely, when the 
observed responses appear as randomly distributed along the dimension, 
our estimation method will find it difficult to identify outcome 
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locations. It will either put the alternatives close to each other at 
a variety of locations, including locations outside the range of 
legislators, or, if unconstrained, make the alternatives very distant 
from one another. (In more conventional jargon, one would term these 
roll calls unsealable. ) 
More generally, attempts at strict maximum likelihood 
estimation of ill-behaved roll calls can result at coordinate 
estimates that are far from the limits of the space defined by the 
legislators. Political theory, however, suggests that one alternative 
should always lie within the space of legislators and that the cutting 
line should also fall within this space. We impose these constraints. 
Coordinate estimates for those roll calls with constraints imposed 
should, however, be viewed as unreliable. 
Perfect Legislators 
One can conceptualize a legislator who is similar to a perfect 
roll call. This individual always votes liberal on roll calls with 
midpoints to his right and conservative on those roll calls with 
midpoints to his left. That is, we would observe: 
ccccccccCCLLLLL • • • LLLL 
This legislator would be located between the rightmost C and the 
leftmost L and is easily identified. However, if a legislator always 
votes liberal or always votes conservative, then he is like an 
unanimous roll call and his .position cannot be identified. For a 
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perfect liberal, all we know is that this legislator is to the left of 
all the midpoints. As a consequence of this identification problem, 
we will obtain relatively imprecise estimates of the locations of 
legislators at the periphery of the space. 
Bias and Consistency 
It is well known that maximum likelihood estimates may be 
biased. In most common applications, they are consistent. As 
Chamberlain ( 19 81 )  points out, the standard proof of consistency 
assumes that the set of parameters remains fixed as the sample size 
increases. But in our case, every additional roll call or every 
additional legislator adds additional parameters. In addition, our 
constraints imply that our estimates are not strictly maximum 
likelihood. Consequently, we report extensive Monte Carlo tests of 
the quality of our procedures. 
Nonconvexity 
Finally, one must cope with the fact that our likelihood 
function is not globally convex. Thus, the estimation procedure may 
converge to an inflection point or local maximum rather than to a 
global maximum. While there is no ultimate solution to this problem, 
we present procedures that, taking advantage of structure specific to 
political choice problems, appear to produce reasonable results. 
IV. NOMINATE : Nominal J)iree Step � st imation 
We now develop NOMINATE, a one dimensional implementation 
using the derivative s of Section II. In doing so,  we use numbered 
paragraphs that corre spond t o  the flow chart of Figure 2. All 
computations are made in single-precision FORTRAN on a DEC 2060. 11 
[Figure 2 here] 
1. Prel iminary Process ing 
The program be ings by reading and proces sing raw rol l call 
vot e s. Announced for and paired for are recorded a s  yes,  announced 
aga inst and paired aga inst are re corded as no. Other forms of 
nonvot ing are treated as missing data . The value of a control 
parameter de term ine s the l evel at which unanimous and near unanimous 
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rol l  cal l s  are exclude d from the analys i s. The e st imate s  of rol l cal l 
coordinates for near unanimous votes will be unre l i able. 
2. Legislator Starts 
To obtain high qual i ty start ing coordinates for legi s l ator s ,  a 
sample of SO roll cal l s  is drawn and subj e ct e d  to a matrix 
decompo sition me thod developed by Poo l e  ( 1983 ) . 12 A p by SO roll call 
matrix R0 i s  de composed into : 
R 0 CT v' + J c' ] + E p p 0 0 ( 21 )  
where T i s  the starting e st imate of legislator coordinates,  E i s  a p p 0 
by SO matrix of residual s ,  and J is a vector of one s of length p. p 
24 
The SO element vectors v and c de f ined l inear mappings for each rol l 
call. The "o" subs cript indi cates the pre sence of miss ing data. 
Standard matrix methods such as s ingular value decomposit ion cannot be 
appl ied to matr ices with miss ing data. 
We normal ize T such that the leftmo st l e g i slator is at -1 , the 
r i ghtmost at +1. 
3. Roll Call Starts 
For each rol l call we obt ain starting coordinates for the 
midpo int ( cutting l ine ) by finding an opt imal prediction conditional 
on the ini tial legislator configuration. As candidate s for the 
starting midpoint, we consider a l l  midpoints b e tween each adj acent 
pair of legislators. For exampl e ,  if al l 100 U. S. Senators vote on a 
particular rol l cal l,  then there are 99 such pairs. For each of the 
99 possible midpoint s ,  every senator to the left of a candidate 
midpoint is a s sumed to vote yes and every senator to the r i ght i s  
a s sumed to vote no. The proce s s  i s  then repe ated with the predictions 
reversed; senators to the left are predicted to vote no , those to the 
right , yes. As a start, we then p i ck the midpoint and the polarity 
that minimizes predi ction errors. For exampl e ,  if the minimum errors 
o ccur when senators to the l eft are predicted to vote no , then "no" is 
de f ined a s  the " l iberal" alternative. 13 
As a start for the l iberal outcome, we use : 
LIB M - 1 + IMI 2 ( 22 )  
where LIB is the l iberal coordinate and M the midpoint . Thi s  
procedure guarantees that both the midpoint and at l east one 
coordinate wil l be contained in [-1 , 1 ] .  
4 .  The Global Iterat ion Technique 
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Af ter obtaining start s ,  the program enters i t s  iterative 
e st imation procedure. Because of the l arge number of parameters , it 
is impractical to e st imate a l l  the parame ters j ointly. We thus f irst 
e st imate the ut i l ity function parameters holding the l e g i sl ator and 
roll cal l starts constant. Then we e st imate the roll call parame ter s ,  
holding the ut i l ity function and the l e g i sl ators constant. As a 
conse quence of ( A2 ) , each rol l call can be treated independently. 
Fina l ly ,  the l eg i s l ator coordinate s are e st imated. A convergence 
check is made and, in the event of failure,  the proce s s  repe ated. 
Th i s  three step estimation procedure implies that the 
coeff icient standard errors produced by the program are technically 
incorrect s ince they are not based on the ful l information matrix for 
the parame ters. However, the only sizeable covariance we are ignoring 
is b e tween the uti l i ty function parame ters and the spatial parameters. 
Cross-derivativ e s  b e tween parameters for different rol l cal l s  and for 
different legi slators are z ero. Each cross-derivative between rol l 
call parameters and l e g i sl ator parame ters contains only a single term, 
corre sponding t o  the l egislator ' s vote on the roll call. The 
magni tude of these cro ss-derivative s i s  thus l ikely to be quite smal l 
rel ative to the se cond derivatives of the parameters themselves which 
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are sums of p or r terms. Monte Carlo results ( se e  below) suggest 
that we get reasonable estimate s of standard e rrors. All e st imation 
of parameters and computation of standard e rrors i s  carried out by an 
a l gorithm based on the Berndt, Hal l ,  Hal l ,  and Hausman ( 1974) me thod. 
4-1. Ut il ity Function 
In e s t imating the ut il ity funct i on, a control option perm its 
holding e i ther � or w const ant or e st imating both parame ters j ointly. 
4-11. Roll Calls 
When roll call coordinate s are e st imated, the midpoint and the 
l iberal coordinate are estimated j ointly; the covariance of these 
parameters is taken into a ccount in computing e s t imated standard 
errors. We e st imate these two parameters,  rather than the two outcome 
locations be cause of the greater stabil ity of the midpoint ( se e  
Sect ion III) rel ative to the outcome coordinat e s. Th e  following pair 
of constraints was imposed on the proce s s. 
A. Midpoint Constra int 
If the maximum l ike l ihood algorithm converged to a 
midpoint > l ,  the midpoint was constrained to +1 and the interval 
[ 0 , 1 ]  was grid se arched for the l iberal outcome that maximized the 
l og- l ikel ihood subj ect to the constraint. A symmetric procedure was 
use d when the al gorithm converged t o  a midpoint < -1. 
Converging to a midpoint exterior to the l e g i s l ators i s  
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tant amount to predict ing an unanimous vote. Predict ing unanimity can 
in f act max imize the l ikel ihood even when the actual voting i s  
nonunanimous. Assume each legis l ator de term ine s his vote by a random 
f l ip of an identical unfair coin. Then predict ing unanimity wil l 
almost certainly lead to a gr eater l ike l ihood than the l ikel ihoods 
associated with interior nonunanimous midpoints. For some roll cal l s ,  
actual voting patterns may inde ed look r andom, since not a l l  rol l 
ca l l s  will fit a unidimens iona l ,  two outcome spatial model and votes 
may be determine d by factors orthogonal to the l e g i s l ator 
conf iguration. While arbitrary, the procedure of constraining the 
midpoint usefully marks a roll cal l as one f or which voting is not 
consi st ent with the model. Impos ing the constraint doe s  not 
appreciably affect the l og-l ikel ihood for the roll call. 
B. Outcomes Out s ide Legis lators Constraint 
When both the l iberal coordinate and the implied value of the 
conservative coordinate are ex terior to [-1,1], we again pl ace 
constraints on the est imates. The midpoint i s  held constant at its 
e s t imated interior value and the l iberal coordinate i s  grid se arched 
over the interval [-1 + M - (M(, M]. Th i s  guarantees that the outcome 
furthest f rom the midpoint wil l remain in the interior. 
When the outcome s go off opposite ends of the dimension, this 
means that there are f ew voting errors on the roll call. Le gis l ators 
are almost uniformly voting for the closest alternative. As explained 
in the In troduc tion, a c e rtain amount of error is ne c e s sary to 
ident ify the l ocation of the outcome s but not the midpo ints. When 
this constraint operate s ,  the midpoint location is reasonably 
estimated but the l iberal coordinate e s t imate is not rel i able. 
4-111. Legislators 
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Again a s  a consequence of A(2) , est imating the l e g i sl ators i s  
a sequence of p one parameter e st imations. In fact,  we conj ecture 
that the conditiona l  l ikel ihood funct ion i s  convex in e a ch 
legis lator' s coordinate. 
5. Coordinate Renormalizat ion 
Af ter each global iteration, all coordinates are renorm al ized 
so that the l e g i s l ator space spans [-1,l]. We def ine convergence a s  
occuring when the three sets of correl ations with the previous global 
iterat ion resul t s ,  l e g i sl ators-to-legi slators, midpoint s- to-midpoint s ,  
and l iberal coordina te s-to- l iberal coordina t e s ,  have a l l  ex ce eded . 99 
for the two previous global iterations. When this happens the 
corresponding regr e s s i ons have intercept s close to 0.0 and s l ope s 
close to 1.0. As defined, convergence with U. S. Senate data almost 
always o ccurs within f ive g l obal iterations. In fact, nearly all the 
improvement in the l ike l ihood functi on take s place within two global 
iterations and most of the improvement take s pl ace within the f irst 
g l obal iteration when the rol l call coordinate s are e st imated. Our 
starting senator coordinates are generally very close to the f inal 
value s .  
A Byproduct :  Ordinary Guttman Scal ing 
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Even i f  a real legisl ature has perfect vot ing behavior, a s  
impl icitly a s sumed i n  much o f  the earl ier l iterature o n  r o l l  c a l l  
analy s i s ,  NOMINATE will extract a l l  the availab l e  spatial information. 
It will Gut tman scale perfect da ta. ( See the Perfect Voting Monte 
Carl o run below. ) Of course,  the l iberal coordinate e st imat e s  should 
be disregarded in such a ca se. 
The output of NOMINATE for noi sy data shows that we obtain ( 1 )  
higher geome tric means and ( 2 )  fewer predict ion errors f o r  individual s  
a t  the extremes o f  the dimension. Th i s  re sult corre sponds to the 
well-known "U- shape funct ion of score distributions" ( reviewed by 
Clausen, 1967 , p. 1026) in ordinary Gut tman scal ing. From the 
viewpoint of our mode l ,  the U-shape is no longer solely an empirical 
relationship. The U-shape follows from our stochast i c  ut il ity model 
and the theoretical expectation, from maj ority rul e ,  that cutting 
l ine s wil l tend to fall near the center of a l e g i s la ture. 
V. ROBUSTNESS OF THE PROCEDURE 
To t e st the robustne s s  of our est imation procedur e ,  we 
conducted a varie ty of alternative e st imations of voting by the U. S. 
Senate. Th e  topics we wished to study include : 
1. Change s in the ut il ity function. 
2. Alternative iteration sequenc e s  for parameter estimation. 
3. Del e tion of ne ar perfect senators. 
4. Choice of rol l cal l s  used to generate start ing value s. 
5. Al ternative methods used to generate starting value s. 
6 .  Inclusion of "nonscalable" roll cal l s. 
7. Inclusion of a "nonscalab l e" sena tor. 
8 .  Assumption o f  a common ut il ity funct ion for a l l  senators. 
9. Inclusion of rol l cal l s  with small minorities. 
Changes in the Ut ility Funct ion 
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I n  developing NOMINATE, it be came c l ear to u s  that e st imat e s  
of p and w became highly c o l l inear a f t e r  a few ini tial iterations. 
Consequently, we f ixed w at .5, a value in the range that l e d  t o  good 
e s t imat e s ,  and e st imated p. Since the l ike l ihood funct ion i s  globally 
convex in p ,  choice of a starting value for P is irrel evant. We will 
henceforth refer to e st imation for the full s e t  of 100 senators in 
1979 with w fixed a t  .5 as the Initial case. 
To study robustne ss of the ut i l ity function, we then f ixed P 
at 15 and carried out an estimation, from the same starts as before, 
with w a s  the variable parameter of the ut il ity function. We a l so did 
a run with P f ixed a t  3 5. 
Changes in the It erat ion Method 
In e ach global iteration in NOMINATE, we f irst e st imate the 
ut il ity function, then the rol l  cal l coordinate s ,  and then the 
senators. As an alterna tive, we e s t imated the ut il ity function ( with 
w fixe d a t  0. 5 )  and then a l terna te d b e tween roll c a l l s  and senators 
until we met our convergence criterion. Then we reestimated the 
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u t i l ity function, alterna ted, and so on. 
Ne ar P e rfect Senators 
When we ran the Initial c a s e ,  we found that Ted Kenne dy 
anchor ed the left end a t  -1 . 0  and J e s se Helms the right end a t  +1 .0. 
The next leftmost senator was P au l  Tsongas a t  . 81 and the next 
r ightmost senator was Gordon Humphrey at . 5 9 .  The se very sub stant ial 
separations didn ' t ac cord with our intu ition. Since Helms had cast 
only 2 5  liberal votes in the 412 rol l  c a l ls we included and Kenne dy 
only 2 8  conservative vot e s ,  we had reason to b e l i eve we were 
confronte d  with a perfect senator identif ication probl em. ( In 
contrast,  Tsongas had 44 conservative vot e s  and Humphrey 45 l iberal 
vote s. ) To stu dy whether including Kenne dy and Helms had distorted 
our e st imate s  of the locations of the other sena tors and the roll 
cal l s ,  we reran the Initial case with Kenne dy and Helms de l e te d. 
Al ternat ive Starts 
The base case and all variants previou s ly mentione d were 
conducted with starts gene rated on the b a s i s  of the f irst 50 roll 
cal l s  included in the estimation for 1979. Since l ike l ihood functions 
that are not global ly convex may be sensitive to starting valu e s  � 
one may go to a l ocal rather than global maximum, we generated three 
alternative sets of starting valu e s  based on rol l cal l s  101-150 , 151-
200 , and 201-250 , a l l  wi th Kenne dy and Helms deleted. 
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Al ternat ive Start ing Methods 
To generate roll call starts in the Ini tial c a s e ,  we f irst got 
starts for the sena tors. We next used the se starts to compute 
centroids of the senators vot ing "lib e ral" and "conservative" and 
averaged the se centroids. The " l iberal" centroid was our l iberal 
coordinate start and the average was the midpoint start. We l ater 
tried the optimal prediction procedure de scribed in Sect ion IV. 
Nonscalable Rol l  Ca lls 
With our optimal predi ction starting method, we can compute an 
ini tial proportionate-redu c t ion- in-error measure : 
pre (number on los ing s i de - numb e r  of errors u s ing opt imal midpoint) number on l osing s ide 
When alternative starts were generated, we had ob served that 
roll cal l s  who se e st imate s differed s trongly were a l l  ro l l  c a l ls with 
low pre. We thu s made runs , u sing the optimal predict ion start method 
and without Kennedy and Helms, with low pre rol l cal l s  de l e te d .  
The "Nonsc a lab le" Wi ll iam Proxmire 
In addition to roll cal l s  not b e l onging to the dimension, it 
i s  po s s ible that a given senator demonstrate s behavior that i s  totally 
inconsi stent with the hypothesized spatial model. Inde ed, we found, 
in a l l  three years, that Wil liam Proxm ire had geometric means ne ar . 40 
whil e  no other senator fell b e l ow .SO. We there fore dupl icated the 
Ini tial case with Proxmire de l e te d  to see whether his behavior had had 
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an appreciab l e  effect on the e s t imation. 
Evalu at ing the Ut i l ity Function Assumption 
Empirical work in e conomics typ i ca l ly a s sumes a common 
underlying u t i l ity function with individu a l  differences arising only 
in endowment s. Our model make s a similar assumpt ion s ince individu a l s  
differ only i n  thei r  ideal point s. We condu c t e d  over time compari sons 
to test thi s  hypothe sis. 
Near Unanimou s Rol l  Ca lls 
When there i s  no opposi tion on a rol l cal l ,  the rol l  call 
provide s no information abou t the senators and i t s  own coordinates 
cannot be identified. P roblems may also arise when there is only a 
small minority on a roll call. Consequently, we varied the l evel a t  
which we excluded roll cal l s  from 1 0  percent minority to 0.5 percent 
minority. 
Resu lts 
Basically ,  our resu l t s  are extremely robu st to the variants 
indicated. Tabl e  1 shows the correlations b e tween the Ini t i al case and 
the estimated coordinates for al l the variant s based on the same set 
of starting valu e s. The lowe st correl ation occu r s  between the roll 
call coordinates when Kenne dy and Helms are deleted. This drop from 
the . 99 level was readily expl aine d by examining s catter diagrams. It 
cou l d  be seen that the correlation is virtu a l ly perfect for 
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coordinates interior to the original locations of Tsongas and 
Humphrey. The deviant roll cal l s  are at the end of the dimension in 
the 98 senator run bu t ,  in the 100 senator run, are given (unrel iabl e )  
interior locations, as a resu l t  o f  the Kennedy and Helms votes. Thu s ,  
the deviations come exa ctly where expected. 
As to the four runs used to compare starting valu e s  -- a l l  had 
Kenne dy and Helms de l e te d  and w f ixed at 0.5 � the l owe st pa irwise 
squared corre lation for senator coordina t e s  was . 9993. When we 
ini t ially condu ct e d  the roll call correl ations, we found subs tant i a l ly 
lower correlations. Upon examining s catter diagrams, we l e arned that 
the departu r e s  from the . 9 9  level were produ ce d  by a smal l  set of roll 
cal l s  that were of the "random looking" vari e ty. Typical ly ,  these 
roll cal l s  wou l d  have the midpoint placed a t  one end of the dimension 
in some of the runs , and a t  the other end in the others. After 
e l iminating the 17 such rol l cal l s  from the correlation analysi s ,  we 
found that the minimum pairwise squ ared correlation for l iberal 
coordinates was 0.9965 and for midpoints was 0.9985. These resu l t s  
demonstrate that inclu ding nonsc a l ab l e  roll cal ls i n  the analysis doe s  
not affect our recovery o f  the senator locations. 
We also f ind l ittle difference in resu l t s  when u s ing 
a l ternative methods for generating rol l c a l l  starts. Generating 
starts from the f irst 50 rol l cal l s  without Kennedy and Helms with the 
f ina l "optimal predi ction" alternative method, we f ind the squared 
correl ation of the senator coordinates with the corre sponding Initial 
case to be . 9995 . After dele ting 17 "random looking" roll cal l s ,  the 
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midpoint squared correl ation w a s  . 9 9 89 and the l iberal coordinate,  
. 9 893. 
We have already establ ished that the nonscalable or random­
looking roll cal l s  appear to have l ittle influence on our abi l i ty to 
re cover senator locations. Might they, however, be affect ing u t i l ity 
function e st imate s  in a way that affect s our re covery of the other 
rol l cal l s? To inve stigate this pos s ib i l i ty, we condu c t e d  two 
e xperiment s ,  with a l ternate start s ,  where only roll cal l s  with pre in 
exc e s s  of 0 . 1 were included. In e a ch c a s e ,  there were 3 57 such ro l l  
cal l s ,  none o f  which had f l ipped m idpoint e s t imat e s ,  etc. relative t o  
the Initial case analy sis. We ran one similar experiment with Kennedy 
and Helms del e te d. The resu l t s  a l l  showed squared corre l ations for 
senators and midpoint s above 0.99 and for l ib e ral coordinates above 
0.97 . However, dele ting these roll c a l l s  l e d  to a shrinking in of the 
senators and midpoints. Their standard deviations were only about 80 
percent of those in the corre sponding c a s e s  where no roll cal l s  had 
been excluded. What had happened was that whereas Kennedy and Helms 
had b e en the only "perfect" senators previou s ly ,  we had b e gun to make 
perfect senators out of other extreme l iberal s and extreme 
conservatives. 
In addition to analyzing prob l ems posed by senators at the 
extremes of the dimension, such as Kennedy and Helms , whose vot e s  are 
"too" predi ctab l e ,  we investigated a potent ial prob l em aris ing from a 
senator who was t otal ly unpredi ctab l e. We made one 1979 run with 
Wil l iam Proxmire delete d  from the analysi s .  Again we found very 
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robu st resu l t s  i n  the form o f  high squared corre l ations , al though 
there was some variation in the dispe rsion of l iberal coordinates from 
the center of the space ( s e e  b e l ow) . We conclude that our resu l t s  are 
not overly sens itive to the inclu s ion of a sma l l  proportion of 
" deviant cases. "  
Proxm ire himself i s  deviant in a l l  three years ; in e ach case 
his e st imated position i s  in the center of the space , a l ikel ihood 
maximizing position for a co in-fl ipper. In fact , for a l l  senators ,  
predictabil ity tends to increase a s  one move s away from the center o f  
the space in e i ther directi on. The qu adratic regression of each 
senator ' s  geometric mean on his coordinate explains about 2 / 3  of the 
variance in ge ometric means. When we added the 1979 g e ometric mean to 
thi s  regression for 1981 ( 2. 5  percent minority run) , we found a 
po sitive coeffic ient that was 3.52 time s its e st imated standard e rror. 
Bu t dele ting P roxmire from the s e t  of observations l owered this ratio 
to 1.77 . We thu s conclu de , that ,  Proxmire excepted, there is l ittle 
systematic variation in predictabil ity that i s  not accounted for by 
spatial position. Thu s ,  our a s sumption of a common u t il ity funct ion 
is not overly unreal istic. 
A Limitat ion 
As discu s sed above, whil e  our resu l t s  general ly appear highly 
robu st in terms of squared correlation measure s ,  we appear to 
encounter problems in deal ing with either senators or rol l cal l s  that 
are "near perfect . "  In fact , de c i s ions about perfect senators and 
perfect roll cal l s  are critical as to how the ..§£.1 of senator 
coordinates locates rel ative to the set of roll call coordina te s and 
to the e st imate of the u t i l ity funct ion. 
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We encountered the effect s of perfectne ss when we began to 
vary the cu toff level for near unanimou s vote s  from the 10 percent 
l evel used in our e arliest run s .  Our resu l t s  with "nonscalab l e" roll 
cal l s  had su ggested to us that the nearly unanimou s roll cal l s  might 
improve our l ocation of senators at the ends of the dimension, even if 
the se roll calls  wou l d  not have a c curate .coordinate e st imate s .  
Inde ed, a s  w e  l owered the cu toff leve l ,  the standard deviation o f  the 
distribu tion of e st imated senator coordinate s increased ( s e e  Table 2 )  
and w e  e l iminated the wide separation b e tween Kennedy and Helms and 
the rest of the Senate . For examp l e ,  Tsongas is moved from -. 81 in 
the 10 percent run to -. 94 in the 0.5 percent run and is ac ceptably 
close to Kennedy . Similarly, Humphrey moves from +.5 9  to +. 89. 
[Tab l e  2 here] 
Fu rther indication that the cu toff level mainly affec t s  how 
the 98 interior senators are l ocated rel ative to Kenne dy and Helms i s  
provided in Tab l e  2. It can be seen that the correl ations with the 10 
percent l evel fal l l e s s  a s  the cu toff l evel is redu c e d  when the 
correl ations are computed over only the 98 interior senators than when 
they are based on a l l  100 senator s .  
However, w e  appear t o  have introdu ced parti cu larly noisy roll 
cal l s  in lowering the cu toff l evel.  As can be seen in Table 17 , the 
estimate of p fal l s  with the cu toff l evel;  a lower level of p 
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corre sponds t o  a n  increase i n  the magnitude o f  the stochastic 
component rel ative to the f ixed component of the util ity. To 
compensate for this l ower value of p, rol l cal l coordinates for roll 
calls above the 10 percent cutoff l evel have to be moved further away 
from the center of the dimens ion. Thu s ,  Tab l e  17 also shows that we 
have to invoke the constraints more frequently as the cu toff l evel is 
lowered. This happens even for roll cal ls that were above the old 
cu t off l eve l s .  Consequently, as w e  l ower the cu tof f  leve l ,  the price 
one pays for more "reasonabl e "  senator coordinates i s  l e s s  
"reasonabl e "  roll c a l l  coordina te s .  
The se problems do not arise i n  the Monte Carlo studies  we 
condu c t e d  ( se e  below) . There al l "tru e "  rol l c a l l  coordinates were 
l ocated a t  the interior of the space . Even though a parti cu l ar random 
sequence cou l d  lead to a near unanimou s vot e ,  the constraint s were 
ne e ded mu ch l e s s  frequently in Monte Carlo runs than with the Senate 
data . 
Several exp l anations for these contrasting r e su l t s  ne e d  to be _ 
considere d :  
1. There i s  a signif icant mu ltidimensional component t o  
Senate voting . Om i s sion o f  these dimensions l e ads t o  a b i as i n  
resu l t s  that i s  affected b y  the cu toff l eve l . 
2 .  The stochast i c  part of the model l argely ref l e c t s  
perceptual error . Thi s perceptu al error varies with the location of 
the senators and the alternative s (as su gge sted in Coomb s ,  1958).  
Near unanimou s vot e s  wou l d  thu s have error l evels
. 
that differ 
systematically from vot e s  with l e sser l evels of unanimity. The se 
different error l evels affect the est imation. 
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3 .  For ce rtain vote s ,  which tend to be near unanimous , our 
two al ternative model should be replaced by an al iena tion model. For 
example, on f inal passage of a bil l ,  there may be no alternative to 
the b i l l  and ne gative vot e s  may reflect only the b il l ' s distance to 
the ideal point and not some other alternative. 
4. For some rol l cal l s ,  both alterna tive s could, in contrast 
to our Monte Carlo runs, lie outside the space of senators. How could 
thi s  ari se? The work o f  P oo l e  ( 19 81 )  and Poole and Dani e l s  (1982 )  
shows that interest groups tend t o  have positions that are a t  or 
beyond the periphery of the senator space. Assume an interest group 
only inve sts in changing s tatus quos that are remote from its ideal 
point ( se e  Romer and Rosenthal , 197 8 ) .  Thus , a l iberal group will be 
most active when i t  perceive s a status quo that i s  off the 
conservative end of the dimension. The group then induce s  a senator 
to propo se l e g i s l ation that is almost a s  extreme as the status quo, 
but in the other direction. 
Whil e  a l l  of these topics merit further rese arch, we summariz e  
our inve stigation of robustne s s  b y  emphasiz ing the positive results : 
1. Within e ach se t of coordina te s ,  corre lations across 
different runs are very high. Thus, it i s  quite appropriate to use 
the se resul ts to a sk whether one senator is more l iberal than another 
or whether one b i l l  is more l ibe ral than another b i l l. 
2. Midpoint and se.nator e s t imate s  move toge ther. That i s ,  
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when regress ions across different runs are computed, the l inear 
transformations of the senator coordinate s and the midpoints are 
highly simil ar. Thus, compari sons can be made in the locations of 
midpoint s rel ative to sena tors. It is only in de al ing with l iberal 
( or conservative ) coordina tes relative to sena tor s that a high de gree 
of caution must be exercised. 
3 .  All our senator coordinate e st imat e s  have squared 
correl ations above . 9 5  with coordinates computed by Poole ( 19 81 )  from 
a l e a st squares metric unfolding of interest group rat ings. This 
result increases our confidence in our own coordina t e s ,  e spe c i al ly 
since the Poole model has an entirely different mathematical structure 
(but one that appropriately l inks the spatial model to ratings rather 
than vote s ) .  
4 .  Given its s impl icity ,  the one-dimensional probab i l i st i c  
model doe s  remarkably wel l  i n  accounting for Senate r o l l  c a l l  
behavior. For further evidence on thi s  point , see Sect ion VIII. 
VI. SCALING RESULTS AND THE CONTENT OF ROLL CALLS 
Senator coordina t e s ,  shown in Tab l e  3 ,  general ly accord with 
common notions of the l ibe ral-conservative spe ctrum in American 
po l itics and need not receive further attention. The substantive 
val idity of our roll c a l l  coordina te s is a more inte rest ing que stion. 
[Tab l e  3 here] 
To address thi s  que sti on, we have c l a s sified the roll cal ls 
into a set of categories that should indi cate, subj e ct t o  the 
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impressionis t i c  nature of content analy s i s ,  whether our recovery i s  
meaningfu l .  I n  e a ch tab l e ,  we give the ICPSR code for the roll cal l ,  
the geometric mean, the l iberal coordinate,  the midpo int , and a 
capsu l e  content summary. The resu l t s  are base d on a 10 percent cu toff 
l evel . 
Our f irst c l a s s i f ication (Table 4 )  de a l s  with roll cal l s  where 
we had exceptional ly low geometric mean s .  To a substantial extent, 
these roll c a l l s  include b i l l s  de al ing with pork barrel or regional 
funding ( tobacco sub s idies,  solar power in Cal iforni a, Tomb igb e e  
waterway, energy impact a s s i stance ) that will always l i e  ou t side o f  
any low dimensional spatial mode l .  Several other vote s ,  without 
geographic t i e s ,  also do not enter into common l iberal-conservative 
frameworks . P ay of Congre s smen and high ranking c ivil servants serve 
a s  examples . There is l ittle indication of a clu stering of votes in 
spe c i f ic i s su e  areas that e scape the l iberal-conservative dimension 
and wou l d  be captured by an additional dimension. 
[Tabl e  4 here] 
All the rol l cal l s  with low geome tri c  means have their 
estimate d  coordinates placed very close together . Conversely, as 
shown in Tab l e  5 ,  the roll cal l s  with the l east separation of 
coordinates also have low geometric means . In that tab l e ,  there is a 
continued emphasis on ge ographic distribu t ion ( railroad service,  D . C. 
airport s ,  revenue sharing, home assistance ) .  
. [Tab l e  5 he re] 
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In contrast to the close toge ther, low geome tr ic mean rol l 
cal l s ,  the high geometric mean rol l cal l s  (Tab l e  6) contain votes on 
key pol icy i s su e s  of the s e s s i on such as the windfal l profits tax in 
197 9 ,  the Federal Trade Commission in 1980 , and the Reagan bu dge t cut s  
and t ax b i l l  i n  1981. There are a l so vot e s  o n  straight l iberal­
conservative i s su e s  without strong regional al location content such as 
fair hou s ing and Chil e .  The midpoint s o n  the se high ge ome tric mean 
roll cal l s  are generally in the center of the spa c e ,  with a l ternative 
coordinates somewhat ou t side the space . Whi l e  the midpoint pl acements 
are undoubtedly accu rate , the extreme locations of the pol icy 
alterna tives are unrealist i c .  They are an adjustment to the apparent 
situation that error on these key i s su e s  is l e s s  than that on more 
" average" roll cal l s .  
[Tab l e  6 her e ]  
Correspondingly, Tab l e  7 shows that the roll calls  with the 
most widely separated coordina tes a l so tend to be one s in which the 
geome tr ic means are far above the average . In 1 9 81 ,  they over l ap with 
the roll cal l s  in Table 6. In 1 97 9 ,  the v isib l e  Taiwan debate j oins 
the oil issue , whi l e  in 1980 there are vot e s  r e l ated to the erosion of 
the welfare spending and regu l a tion o f  the previous de cade . The roll 
cal l s  in Tab l e s  6 and 7 cover a wide variety of foreign and dome stic 
i s sue s ,  sug ge st ing that a common l ibe ral-conservative dimension may 
underl ie the mu l tipl icity of scales found in e arl ier analyses ( e . g . , 
Cl au sen, 1 97 3 ) .  However, social control i s sue s ( abortion, school 
prayer, the draft )  are not repre sented.  
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[Tab l e  7 here] 
A means of examining roll cal l s  that are more " typical" on the 
l iberal-conservative scale is to study roll cal l s  whose midpoint s are 
near the mean midpoint for the scal e ,  as in Tab l e  8. The geometric 
means in this t able tend to be close to the overall geome tri c  me an. 
We here f ind a very broad range of pol icy items covering dome stic,  
foreign, and defense pol i cy, social control i s su e s  again excepted. 
The only obviou sly g e ographically l inked i s sue concerns a 
hydroelectric proj ect in Maine. 
[Tab l e  8 here] 
In Tab l e  9 ,  we have tabu l ated all rol l  cal l s  whose midpoints 
were constrained to the end o f  the dimension repre sented by the 
minority party. Again, we f ind some roll cal l s  that don ' t f it the 
dimension becau se of the ir impl ications for geographic distribu t ion 
( g a sohol,  Mt . St. Hel ens, water re source s ) . More importantly, we f ind 
rol l cal l s  on which members of the maj ority party were cross-pressured 
between ideol ogy and support for the President. The se include MX in 
197 9 ,  the draft in 1980 ,  and su gar sub s idie s in 1 9 81 . (The su gar 
sub sidies had ge ographic impl ications but were also the price the 
Pre sident had paid for Boll Weevil support. ) The votes are votes that 
are generally one s ide d. Everyone is predi cted to vote with the 
maj ority. The analysis of vote s with the midpoint constrained to the 
maj or ity end, shown in Table 10 , is s imilar to the above. 
[Tab l e s  9 and 10 here ] 
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To summarize thi s  section, the variou s  categoriz ations of the 
roll call coordinate s have disclosed that NOMINATE produ c e s  sensib l e  
resu l t s. The i tems that least f it the dimension seem to be primarily 
those where geographic distribu t ion is the paramount cons ideration. 
One social control i s su e ,  draft registration, tended to go off the end 
of the dimension. Another,  abortion, appe ared only once in our 
tab l e s ,  de spite many votes. Other feminist i s su e s  never appe ared .  
This indicates that they a r e  fairly standard "noisy" issu e s  o n  the 
dimensi on. Cl assica l  fore i gn pol icy i s su e s  and dome stic policy i s su e s  
involving income redi stribu t ion ( including taxation) and bu s ine s s  
regu l ation appear to be the l e a st noi sy i s sue s .  
VII. MONTE CARLO RESULTS 
Having e stabl ished that our resu l t s  for the Senate are very 
robu st to several variations in the te chnique u s e d  for recovery and 
have face val idity in their pol itical interpretation, we next sought 
to a scertain how wel l  our t e chniqu e s  wou l d  perform if the real world 
in f act corresponded exactly to the behav ioral assumptions underlying 
our model of probab il is t i c  voting. To that end, we condu c t e d  12 
simulations. In 11 of the s e ,  we a s sumed that the true senator 
coordinates were those from the 1979 run with 98 senators other than 
Kenne dy and Helms. In the twel fth, denoted the "50 Senator" run, we 
used 50 of the se coordinates drawn, b a s i ca l ly, by alternat ing along 
the continuum. In e l even runs, we generated random Weibu l l  errors by 
u sing the IMSL uniform distribu t i on generator and then inverting the 
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Weibu l l  cumu l ative distribu t ion. In order to minimize random effects 
on the compari sons , we used the same seed across runs, except runs G-1 
(Tab l e  3 ) . This de c i s i on i s  of l ittle consequence since 2pr random 
numbers are generated for a simulation. In another run, denoted 
"Perfect Voting , "  we a l l owed e a ch senator to vote , without error, for 
the closest al ternative . 
In 10 of the 11 c a s e s  where u t il ity had a random component , we 
used ( 9 )  as the u t i l ity function. In the el eventh case,  denoted 
"Linear Uti l ity , " we as sumed that the nonstochastic portion of util ity 
was g iven by 15 .0-1 .725d . •  J 
Rol l  c a l l  coordinates were generated as fol low s .  In the case 
of L inear Util ity, Perfect Vot ing , and s imu lations A through E, we 
a s s i gned 97 midpoints at the midpoints of adj acent senator pairs . We 
then assigned three l iberal coordinates for each midpoint , u s ing the 
formu l a  
LIB M - 1 + IMI k • k 1 .7 5 , 2 .00 , 2 .2 5  
I n  the A run, w e  set p = 15 .0 and w = 0 .5 .  In runs B-E, we 
u s e d  other valu e s  of p in order to study how re covery was affected by 
the l evel of error rel ative to the f ixed portion of the util ity .  
Th e  runs A-E resu l t  i n  l iberal coordina te s that are correlated 
. 95 with the midpoint s .  Consequently, a good f i t  t o  the l iberal 
coordinates in the se simulations cou l d  be du e solely to our ab ility to 
recover the midpoint s .  I n  the F run, we rendered the l iberal 
coordinates independent of - the midpoint s .  We u sed only the 26 
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midpoints between - .4999 and - . 1686 . With each of these midpoint s ,  we 
a s si gned 11 l iberal coordinates from -1 . 0  to -0 . 6  in steps of 0 .04 . 
This resu l ted in 26 X 11 = 2 86 roll cal l s .  Sti l l  another me thod was 
u se d  in simul ations G to I .  For a l l  9 7  midpo int s previously u se d  in 
runs A to E, we generated l iberal coordina tes by 
LIB = M - (1 + IMI ) k ,  
where k - U[O , l ] . 
For the 3 5  midpoints with IMI  < .51 , only one l iberal coordinate was 
generated. For the other 62 midpoints ,  four coordinates were 
generated. This resulted in a total of 2 83 rol l  cal l s  on e ach run. 
Ut i l ity Funct ion Re su l t s  
Estimate s of p,  shown i n  Tab l e  11 , contain upward b i a s ,  
al though the recovered valu e s  i n  runs A-E retain the order of the true 
coeff icient s .  This bias doe s  not sub stant i a l ly impinge upon our 
ab il ity to recover those parame ters that are of primary sub stantive 
intere st,  the spa tial coordinate s .  
[Table 11 here] 
Senator Re su lts 
The resu l t s  for the senator s ,  also shown in Tab l e  11 , are 
except ional ly good both in terms of R?- valu e s  and regression standard 
errors ( the square root of the average squared residu a l ) . Since the 
We ibu l l  errors are independent across senators ,  it is not surprising 
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that senators are re covered as we l l  in the 50 Senator run as in the 9 8  
Senator runs. Recovery of the senators would a l so appear to be quit e  
robust to m i s spe c i f ication of the ut il ity function, as demonstrated by 
the re sults for the L inear Util ity model. There is a not iceab l e  drop 
in R2 only when there is P erfect Vot ing. In this case,  however, we 
almost perfectly recover the ordering of the senator s ,  as shown in 
Figure 3. (Of course,  the Perfect Voting run did not converge ; the 
program was stopped after f ive global iterations. ) Whil e  interval 
information cannot be identified with perfect voting, our program 
accurately recovers all the ordinal information in this case. 
[Figure 3 he re] 
S ince a l l  the senator simulations are based on over 100 fewer 
roll calls  than our resul ts for the 1979 and 1980 Senate s ,  there i s  
every reason to b e l i eve our resul ts for the Senate a r e  extremely 
accurate. 
Rol l  Cal l s  
For coordinates other than the senators ,  w e  report , i n  Tab l e s  
1 2  - 14,  informat ion in addition to R2 and regr e s s ion standard e rrors . 
Since a space is def ined only up to a l inear transformation, it i s  
appropriate to evaluate the sena tors o n  the b a s i s  of the regression 
between the true and recovered coordinates. But even if, for exampl e ,  
the regres sion between true and recovered l iberal coordina tes showed 
low error s, the l iberal coordinates could vary systematically with 
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re spe ct to the senators. Such systematic variation would re sul t in 
inappropriate subst antive compari sons of b i l l s  and senators. 
Consequently , in addition to comput ing regressions, we have also 
transformed recovered rol l call coordinate s by the regress ion 
e st imated for the senators and then comput ed the root mean square 
error between the transformed coordinate s and the true coordina te s .  
Compari son o f  the root mean square error t o  the standard error o f  the 
regression indicate s the extent to which the space of the roll cal l 
coordinates has been "de formed" rel ative to that of the senator s .  We 
have also comput ed the mean error of the transformed coordinate s in 
order to indicate any b i a s  in our recovery methods. 
Tab l e s  12-14 corre spond to the midpoint s ,  the l iberal 
coordinates , and the spreads or differenc e s  between midpoints and 
l iberal coordina tes. We report "unf iltered" re sul ts for a l l  roll cal l s  
and " fil tered" re sul ts where rol l cal l s  whose untransformed 
coordinates differed from the true midpo int , l iberal coordinate , or 
spread by more than 0.5 were e l iminated. 
[Tab l e  12 her e ]  
Midpo ints 
In the case of the midpo int s ,  resul ts are exc e l lent for runs 
A-F ,  the L inear Util ity run, and Perfect Vot ing. The l ow !?- for run F 
is due solely to the l ow variance in true midpo int s ;  standard errors 
are still good. Al l the standard e rrors are somewhat l arger than 
those for the senators s imply be cause e a ch senator is e st imated via 
2 80 +  roll cal l s  whereas each rol l c a l l  is e st imated from only 98 
senator s. Once again, as shown in Figure 4,  there is near perfect 
recovery of the ordinal information under Perfect Vot ing. Figure 5 
provide s the compari son for run E. Thanks to the error in run E, we 
recover the metric information in the midpoints. While there i s  
obv iously more scatter than with perfect voting, the plot i s  l inear. 
A s imilar l inear plot, with l e s s  scatter, is obtained for senator 
coordinate s. 
[Figu r e s  4 and 5 here] 
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There are l arger errors for runs <T-I. The reason for thi s  i s  
that some o f  the randomly generated l iberal coordinate s were very 
close to the midpoints. When thi s  happens , all senators are close to 
f l ipping fair coins on the roll cal l ,  and the recovered p l acements can 
occur anywhere. Fil tering out 20 or fewer particu l arly bad roll calls  
improves resu l t s  dramatically. In pract ical use of the program, one 
wou l d  not take seriou s ly midpoint e st imates where the heuristic 
constraint on midpoints was impo sed or where the ge ometric mean was 
exceptional ly low. Using these criteria wou l d  have f il tered s imil arly 
to our ex post f il tering for runs <T-I. 
Like the senators ,  bias is not a se riou s  problem in re covery 
of the midpoints. Although the midpoints vary over a range of two 
uni t s ,  the highest mean error on a 98 Senator run was only . 013. This 
occu rred on simu l at ion C, the run for which the no ise component was 
greatest rel ative to the systematic u t i l ity. 
so 
Libe ral Coordinate s  
Liberal coordinates a r e  recovered l e s s  accu rately than 
midpo int s ( c ompare Figure 6 to Figure 5 ) . This i s  not surpri s ing, 
since l iberal coordinate s cannot be ident ified in the l imiting case of 
P e rfect Voting. The high � in that case resu l t s  solely from 
corr e l ation b e tween true midpoints and true l iberal coordinates. In 
fact,  there is subs t antial b i as to the P erfect Voting recovery. 
However, with stochast i c  u t i l ity, we recover l iberal coordinates with 
more acceptab l e  root mean square errors even when the distribu tion of 
midpo ints i s  independent of that of the l iberal coordinates a s  in 
s imu l ation F. (The l ow � for thi s  s imu l a tion reflects the l ow 
variance of l iberal coordinate s. ) In fact , s imu l ation F has the 
l owe st root mean square error, pre sumably be cau se the independence 
a l l ows the data to provide more information about the l iberal 
coordinates. 
[Figu r e  6 here ] 
The sub s t ant ial root mean square errors are greatly redu c e d  by 
filtering. The f il tered roll c a l l s  almost without exception 
corre spond to roll cal l s  where a midpoint was constrained to one end 
of the dimension. With real data, l iberal co ordina tes re covered 
without the u s e  of constraint s are l ikely to be reasonably accu rate. 
[Tab l e  13 her e ]  
There is some evidence of modest b i a s ,  with the l iberal 
coordina te s be ing too far to the " left" of the true. The worst case 
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was -.083 for run B, the run closest to Perfect Vot ing. In any event , 
compari son of the 50 Senator run with run A suggests that sma l l  sample 
b i a s  for both midpoints and l iberal coordinates attenuates 
a sympt otical ly and that our estimate s  are e ssent ially consistent. 
Spreads 
The story for the spreads e s sent i a l ly paral l e l s  that for the 
l iberal coordina t e s .  Not e ,  though, that the R2 on the spreads i s  
virtually 0 .0 for Perfect Voting , as expected theoretical ly. There i s  
al so a very low R2 for the misspe c i f ication o f  the Linear Util ity 
Model. In that case,  the root mean square error is not substant ially 
reduced by filtering. Despite having quite small standard e rrors ,  
runs A-E show mode st R2 value s. This i s  be cause the spreads have low 
variance on the se runs, a condition re sulting from the high covariance 
be tween midpoints and l iberal coordinate s. The spreads are most 
a c curately recovered on run F where the l iberal coordinate s do not 
covary with the midpoints. 
[Table 14 he re] 
Standard Errors 
NOMINATE produce s ,  in addition to the parame ter estimat e s ,  an 
e stimate of the standard e rror for each est imate. As explained in 
Section Ill, these standard e rrors should be viewed with caution. To 
evaluate the accuracy of the estimat e s  we can compare the root mean 
square errors produced in the Monte Carlo runs with the average 
standard errors computed from the Senate data . Comparing Tables 11-13 
to Tab l e  15 shows that the two quant i t i e s  are reasonably s imilar for 
rol l cal l s  without constrained e st imate s. 
[Table 15 here] 
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These Monte Carl o resut s are e choed by our time series for the 
Senate . We took the P and Senator coordina tes e st imated for 1979 ( 2. 5  
percent cutoff) and u s e d  the se parameters both as f ixed parameters to 
e st imate the 1 9 80 rol l c a l l  parame ters ( nStart" column in Tab l e  16)  as 
wel l  as starting value s to e s t imate a l l  parame ters for 1980 ( nFinal" 
column in Table 16 ) .  When we treat the 1979 resul ts a s  f ixed 
parameters, we are comput ing the estimate d covariance matrix corre ctly 
since P and the x are f ixed and there is no covariance among z from 
dif ferent roll cal l s. Consequently, in that c a s e ,  we are 
appropriately comput ing s t andard e rrors ( for unconstrained roll 
cal l s ) .  As can be seen in Tab l e  16 , there are no maj or differenc e s  
between the two sets of standard e rror est imate s. 
[Tab l e  16 here] 
Summary of Monte Carlo Ana lys is 
In one dimensional legisl atures the size of the Senate,  
interval spatial posit ions can be re covered to a high de gree of 
accuracy. Even more accurate recovery would be pos s ib l e  in a l arger 
l e g i s l ature the size of the House of Repre sentatives. Ther e ,  root 
mean square error s for midpoints and l iberal coordinates should 
approach those found for senator coordina te s and the smal l  bias in the 
recovery of the l iberal coordina tes should be further attenuated. 
VII I .  'IHE LIBERAI..-CONSERVATIVE CONTINUUM I N  THE SENATE 1979-81 
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In thi s  section, we provide a brief interpre ta tion of our 
re sult s  for 197 9-81. First, we show that our re sul ts corre spond wel l 
to an e l ementary spatial model of how the maj ority party woul d conduct 
bus ine ss in the Senate . Second, we show that a one dimensional model 
correctly c l a s s i f ie s  about 4/5 of the individual vote s  in the Senate . 
Third, we use our re sul ts to interpret the conservative shift brought 
about by the 1980 elections . Fina l ly, we indicate some resul t s  in 
terms of the sub stance of individual roll cal l s .  For further 
sub s tantive appl ication of our resul ts,  see Poole and Smith ( 1983 ) .  
Spat ial Behavior in the Aggregate 
In a one dimensional legisl ature with probabil i s t i c  voting, 
maj ority leadership should p l an votes such that midpoints l ie somewhat 
away from the medi an voter. By moving a sl ight dist ance away from the 
median voter ,  the probab il ity of passage can be increased 
substant ially .  Thus , when the Democrats control the Sena t e ,  the 
average midpoint should be to the right of the median sena tor; when 
the Repub l icans control , it should be to the l e f t .  As Tab l e  17 shows,  
the empirical resul t s  corre spond with thi s  spa tial mode l .  Note that, 
except for overal l shifts in the spa c e ,  the l ocations of "median" 
senators are quite stab l e  and that the location of the average 
midpoint rel ative to the median senator holds for all cutoff leve l s .  
[Table 1 7  here]  
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Expl anatory Power 
An overall a s s e s sment of the mode l ' s  f it to the data i s  
indicated b y  the geome tric mean probab i l ity value s i n  Tab l e  17 , which 
are substant ially l arger than the 0.5 implied by random voting . 
If we want to "predict" individual vote s ,  we nee d  only know a 
senator ' s  location rel ative to the midpoint . Thus , the analysis shown 
in Tab l e  18 is only a partial examination of our mode l ,  which 
estimates the outcome coordinat e s  as wel l  as the midpoint . 
Nonethe l e s s ,  the table provide s some interest ing compari sons with 
rel evant nul l mode l s .  The f irst null prediction w e  cons ider i s  
"Democrats always vote the Liberal side o f  a n  i ssue and Repub l icans 
vote the Conservative side . " ( Recall that the Liberal and 
Conservative sides of an i s sue are identi f ied in our procedure for 
obtaining starting value s . )  The se cond nul l prediction i s  that 
Liberals always vote Liberal and Conservative s always vote 
Conservativ e .  We identi fy as a Liberal ( Conservative ) any senator who 
vote s the Lib e ral ( Conservative) s ide on a maj ority of the rol l cal l s .  
Comparing the se cond predi ction t o  the first shows the gain i n  us ing 
general l iberal-conservative preference over party. Comparing the 
third to the se cond shows the gain in using the metr i c  information 
that l ocates a senator ' s  l iberal-conservative position relative to the 
midpoint on each roll c a l l .  
[Tab l e  1 8  here]  
Estimating the midpoints i s  inde ed very useful in c l a s s i fying 
outcomes.  As shown in the tab l e ,  about 80 percent of the individual 
55 
vote s, substant i a l ly more than in the straight l ibe ral-conservative 
predi ctions , are correctly c l a s s ified by NOMINATE. Note that 1981 
differs from the prior Congre s s  in two ways. First, classif ication i s  
improved. Second, there is l e s s  of a gain for the l iberal­
conservative model over the party model. The se resul ts are cons i st ent 
with our earl ier cl aim, based on coordina te s developed from interest 
group data through 1980 , that American po l itics are becoming 
increasingly pol arized along a unidimensional , party- l inke d continuum 
( Poole and Rosenthal ,  1983 ) . 
It should be further not e d  that the entr ies in the table 
unde rstate the advantage of estimating the midpoints. Our 
class if ications are l e a st correct in the center of the space. 
Re gress ions show that we corre ctly c l a s si f ie d  about 3 / 4  of the votes 
for senators near z ero and almost all of the votes at the periphery. 
However, at the pe riphery we obviously improve l ittle over a straight 
l iberal-conservative model. Kenne dy and Helms are almost a s  
predic table a s  the tide s. In contrast , w e  make substant ial 
improvements a t  the center. Here re gre ssions show that we predict 
about 13 percent more of the vot e s  correctly ( a s  against 10 percent 
overal l ) .  
Est imat ing the Cons ervat ive Swing in 1981 
One additional point i s  made by Tabl e  1 8. When the Democrats 
control the Senate,  there are more Liberals than Democrats while with 
Repub l ican control ,  there are more Conservatives than Repub l icans. 
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There are two complementary reasons for this phenomenon. 
The f irst factor l eading to an increase in Conservative s i s  
that a r i sk-averse Senate l eadership will place midpoints somewhat 
away from the median member of the Senate in orde r to increase the 
l ike l ihood of succe s sful passage. This means that senators in the 
middl e of the distribut i on wil l tend to vote on the Liberal side unde r 
a Democratic maj ority and on the Conservative side unde r a Repub l ican 
maj ority. Thus , the shifting distribution of midpoints will affect 
how we classify senators a s  Liberals or Conservative s. 
The complementary reason i s  that senators in the center "go 
along t o  ge t al ong. " As shown in Tab l e  1 9 ,  while the most l ib e ral 
third of the Senate barely changed posit ions b e tween 1979 and 1981 , 
the other two-thirds moved very sub stant i a l ly to the right. 14 ( Recall 
that the standard e rrors with which we e s t imate senator posit ions are 
on the order of 0.05 ;  consequently, an average shift on the order of 
.2 to .3 in a group of nine sena tors is highly signif icant . )  The only 
exception i s  the rightmost set of nine senators who were already at or 
close to 1 .0 ;  any r ightward movement on thei r  part is constraine d. 
Inde ed, these resul ts il lustrate the intere sting substantive 
analysis that can be done with spatial coordinates. It is well-known 
that the senators e l ected in 1981 were far more conservative than 
those they repl aced. This change is readily p icked up in our 
coordinates. Eighteen senators pre sent in 197 9 and gone in 1981 had a 
mean position of -.2 8 .  The ir repl acements had a mean position, in 
1981 ,  of . 5 8. What our data further indicate is that much of the 1979 
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Senate fol l owed the se new entrants to the right. Inde ed, while Helms 
no l onger anchors the conservative end, three of the six senators now 
ranked a s  more conservative than Helms were to his left in 197 9 .  The 
ne t e ffect of these change s  can be summarized by comparing the mean 
Conservative (now winning) coordinate s for 1981 to the mean Liberal 
coordinates for 197 9 .  On average , the winning pol icy posi tion shifted 
about one unit or hal f the length of the Libe ral-Conservative space in 
the Senate. 
These resul t s  sugge st that NOMINATE and l ater evolutions of 
the program wil l provide a useful methodol ogy for analyzing the 
abundant recorded history of rol l call votes. 
• 
FOOTNOTES 
This work was initi ated while Poole was a Pol it i cal Economy 
Fe llow a t  Carne gi e-Me l lon and completed whi le Rosenthal was a 
Fairchild Scholar at Cal tech. We also acknowledge the 
substant ial comput ational support of the Graduate School of 
Industrial Adm inistration at Carneg i e-Me l lon. This vers ion o f  
the paper h a s  benef ited from seminars a t  Cal tech and Stanford. 
5 8  
1 .  We i sberg ( 1968) contains a comprehensive review o f  the l iterature 
up to 1 96 8 .  
2 .  Even when l e g i sl ators always vote for the closest a l ternative, 
the proportion of disa greement depends upon both the distance 
between the two l e g i sl ators, the ang l e  they form with the 
( arb itrary) origin of the spac e ,  and the distribut ion of cutting 
l ine s of b i l l s. 
3. Whil e  MacRae (1958) should be credited with the model that e ach 
roll call is two points on the continuum, hi s rol l call analysi s  
methods d o  not re cover the point s. 
4 .  Because the ej have a continuous distribution, equal ut i l i t i e s  
c a n  be ignored. 
5 .  Over an entire data set,  P e
l /A where A denotes the total 
number of choices actua l ly made over all choice sets and 
indiv idual s. 
6 .  For further approache s to summariz ing the resul t s  of logit 
e s t imation, se e Amemiya (1981 ) .  
7 .  Ties can be de alt with, say, by random assignment. 
8. Al lowing for various e l ements of the model to depend upon 
exogenous characteristics ( e . g . , education, race , income) is a 
straightforward gene ral iz ation of the methods pre sented here . 
5 9  
9 .  The quantity p also control s the maximum choice probab i l ity .  I f  
the choice s e t  i s  binary, thi s  probab il ity is s imply eP/( ep + 1 ) .  
10. Te sts of thi s  type , omitted here, are il lustrated i n  Pool e  and 
Rosenthal ( 1982 ) .  
11. Expe rimentation showed that s ingl e-pre c i sion gave virtual ly 
ident ical results to doub l e-precision. Of course , s ingle 
precis ion is much l e s s  costly. 
12. When not all l e g is l ators serve for the ful l l ength of the data 
set,  the sampl e must be drawn so a s  to include some votes for a l l  
legislator s .  
13. O f  course,  a t i e  i s  po s s ib l e  for the fewe st prediction errors. 
In such a case, the start is that tied midpo int closest to the 
center of the l eg i s l ator configuration. In case this midpoint 
giv e s  the same number of errors for both polarit i e s ,  "ye s" is 
def ined as " l iberal . "  In this l atter case,  the rol l call wil l 
fit the dimension poorly regardl e s s  of the start de cision. 
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14. This re sult holds when 1980 is compared to 1 9 81. The R2 of 1 9 81 
on 1979 is 0. 83 , on 1 9 80 ,  0. 82. The even stronger monotonic 
relationship, showing the non- l inear shifts in posit ion, is 
simil ar in both years. The result s  also hold for runs of 
different cutoff l eve l s .  Note that we are not making statements 
about absolute ide ological shifts in t ime. What the data show is 
that about 2 / 3  of continuing Senate members moved away from 
Kenne dy and Toward Helms . 
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TABLE 1 
COMPARI S ON OF THE IN IT IAL CASE AND ALTERNAT IV E  ESTIMAT ION S 
Square d  Co rre l a t io n s  With Init ial  Case  
Geome t r i c  Liberal 
A l t ernat ive Mean S enato r s  Midpo int s Coo rdinat e s  
S = 3 5 ,  w free 0 . 6 5 47* 0 . 9 9 9 9  0 . 9 9 9 8  0 . 9 96 9  
S = 1 5, w free 0 . 6 541 0 . Y9 8 2  0 .  9 9 6 9  0 . 9 9 2 1  
w = 0 . 5 , S free,  
Al t ern.  iter . me t hod 0 . 6 545 o. 9 99 6  0 . 9 9 90 0 . 9 843 
w = 0 . 5 , 8 free, 
H e lms,  Kenne dy out 0 . 6 4 9 1** 0 . 9 9 9 1  0 . 9687  o .  9628  
* Equ al  to  ba se c a s e . 
** I s  lower than init i a l  c a se because Kennedy and H e lms vot ing r e co r d s  served 
to  r a i s e  over a l l  geome t r i c  mean. 
°' °' 
Cut o f f  l evel 
1 0  per cent 
5 per cent 
2 . 5 percent 
0 . 5  per cent 
TABLE 2 
EFFECTS OF NEAR UNANIMOU S V OT ING CUTOFF LEV ELS 
Senator 
S t d .  Dev .  
o .  3 6 1  
0 . 408 
0 . 41 0  
0 . 45 9  
Senat o r  R2 
With 1 0% 
1 00 Senat o r s  98  Senators* 
1 . 000 1 . 000 
0 . 9 9 1  o .  9 9 6  
0 . 9 5 8  0 . 9 9 1 
0 . 9 5 8  0 . 9 7 1  
* Computed only for 9 8  senato r s  o t her t han Kennedy and H e lm s .  
Number o f  
Ro l l  Cal l s  
4 1 2  
4 1 5** 
41 5** 
41 5** 
** Current program l im i t a t io n  i s  4 1 5  ro l l  c al l s .  F i r s t  41 5 ro l l  c a l l s  in 
1 97 9  me e t ing cuto f f  criterion were inc l uded .  
O'\ 
...... 
TABLE 3 
SENATOR COORDINATES 
1 9 7 9  1980 1981 1 9 7 9  1980 1981 
t\ E N if f I1 ·r , E - 1 . 0 (• -0 . 7 9 - 1 . 00 J O H N S T O N • J - o . o.::i 0 . 1 1  o .  1 6  
D O flli • C J f.: - 0 . 8 3 I1 E C O N C I N I  - 0 . 0 2 0 . 02 - 0 . 0 4 
T S C1 N G A S , F' - 0 . 8 1 - 0 . 5 6 -0 . 6 2 S T O N E , R - 0 . 0 2 0 . 08 
B F: A LIL [ Y ,  W - 0 . 7 1 -0 . 6 8 - 0 . 4 7 L O N G • R - 0 . 0 1  0 . 1 8 0 . 2 7 
W l L L l A M S , H - O . o 9 - 1 . 0 0  - 0 . 5 7 M O F: G A N , R - 0 . 0 1  0 . 2 1 
S ?t f.: B H t� E  5 ,  F' - 0 . 6 b - 0 . 6 3 - 0 . 7 1  S T E N N I S •  J - 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 9 0 . 2 7 
M C G mJ E R N , G - 0 . 6 6  - 0 . 3 2 F' R O X M J R E ,  W 0 . 0 2 o . 1 3 0 . 2 2 
L E V J N , c - 0 . 6 6 - 0 . 4 4 - 0 . 8 8  D A N F O R T H • J 0 . 0 3 0 . 3 2 o . 5 5 
MF T Z E N H1LI M  - 0 . 6 3 - 0 . 3 b - 0 . 7 1  C O H [ N , W 0 . 0 4 0 , 3 0 o . 4 3 
R l E G L E • D - o .  6 ?  - 0 . 4 8 - O , b 6 H E F L I N ,  H 0 .  oc. o . 1 3  0 . 0 7 
C LJ L �iu.: , J -:- 0 . b •:I - 0 , 6 3 B E L L M O i� , H 0 . 0 7 0 . 3 7 
R J b I C O F F • t'.1 - 0 . 6 (1 - 0 . 4 2 F' R E S S L E F: ,  L 0 . 0 8 0 . 3 7 o . 3 3 
N E L 5 0 f� ,  G - 0 , 5 6 - 0 . 4 8 B O S C H W I T Z 0 . 1 4 0 . 3 6 0 , 4 8 
F'[ L L ,  c - 0 . 5 6 - 0 . 4 3 - 0 . 5 1 B A t< E R , H 0 . 1 5  0 , 4 7 o . 7 1 
C F.: A N S T O N  r A - 0 . 5 2 - 0 , 59 - 0 . 6 8 Z D F: I N S l\ Y r E 0 . 1 6 0 , 3 3 0 . 1 9 
M O Y N I H A N , F' - 0 . 5 2  -0 . 4 6 - 0 . 4 8 B O f.: E N , [I 0 . 1 7 0 . 2 4 0 . 1 1  
B f'1 Y H ' E� - 0 . 4 9 -0 . 1 9 l\l1 S S E B ?1 U M  o . 1 8 0 . 3 0 0 . 4 8 
S TE IJ [ r� S O N  - 0 . 4 9 - 0 . 3 7 S T nl E N S • T 0 . 1 8 0 , 4 3 0 . 6 0 
J A V I T S • J - 0 . 4 5 - 0 . 1 2  S C HW E i t\ E R  0 . 2 0 0 . 3 7 
L E A rl 'i' , F' - 0 . 4 4 -0 . 3 2 - 0 . 5 7 Y O U N G , M 0 . 2 1  0 . 4 2 
M U S U E , E - 0 . 4 3 -0 . 1 5 D O L E ,  R 0 . 2 6 0 . 36 o . 7 4 
J A C t\ S O r• , H - 0 . 4 2 - 0 . 2 9 - 0 . 2 2 C O C H F: A N  • T 0 . 26 0 . 4 8 0 . 6 4 
M A T S U N A G f� - 0 . 4 2 - 0 . 4 6 - 0 . 4 3 D O M E N I C  I ,  F' 0 . 2 7  0 . 4 4 o . 7 o 
I N O U Y E • [I - 0 . 4 1  - 0 . 2 4 - 0 . 4 1  S C H M I T T ,  H 0 . 3 0 0 , 5 2 o . 7o 
B H1 E N , J - 0 . 4 0 -0 . 23 - 0 . 4 4 H A Y A �: A W l; r S o . 3 1 0 . 6 0 0 . 8 9 
B A U C LJ S , M - 0 . 3 B -0 . 30 - 0 . 30 R O T H • W o . 3 1 0 . 5 5 o . 4 8 
E A G L E T O N • T - 0 . 36 -0 . 1 3 - 0 . 6 4 S F· E C T E F: ,  A 0 . 3 2 
M I T C H E L L ,  G - 0 . 3 2 - 0 . 3 6 W A F: N E F: r J o . 4 2 0 . 5 1 o . 7 4 
H ?1 F d  • G - 0 . 3 6 -0 . 1 5 - 0 . 5 4 B Y R D , H F  o . 4 3 0 . 4 6 o . 5 2 
G L E N N , J - 0 . 34 -0 . 1 2 - 0 . 2 0 L U G A R • R 0 . 4 3 0 . 5 5 o . 7 9 
D LI F: t :  I N ,  J - 0 . 3 3 -0 . 2 0 S l M F' S O N • A o . 4 4 o . 5 6 o . 7 6  
M A G N U S O N , W - 0 . 3 0 -0 . 2 5 W A L L  O F· , M o . 4 5 0 , 5 7 0 . 82 
M �1 T H I A �· •  C - 0 . 27 - 0 . 1 6 0 . 1 9 T O W E R r J o . 4 7 0 . 6 9 o . s 4 
B U M F · E F: S  • fl - 0 . 2 5 - 0 . 1 1 - 0 . 5 0 A N I1 R E W S •  M o . 5 o 
B U R D I  C t\ , Cl -0 . 2 4 -o . 1 6 -o . 1 5 G O L D W A T E R  o . 52 o .  7 2  0 . 04 
B Y F: [I ,  R C  - 0 . 2 2 -0 . 1 1 - 0 . 2 6 R U II M A N , W 0 . 5 5 
C H I L E S • L - 0 . 2 1 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 0 6 H A W U N S • F' 0 . 5 5 
WE I Cl\ Ef.: , L - 0 . 2 1  - 0 . 0 4 0 . 1 9 J E P S E N • R o . 55 0 . 6 3 0 . 7 9 
G R A V E L , M - 0 . 2 0 - 0 . 2 3 T H U R M D N D r S o . 5 7 0 , 6 5 0 . 8 2 
H U D D L E S T O N - 0 . 2 0 -o . 1 2 - 0 . 1 7 G O R T O N , s 0 . 5 8 
M E L C H E F: '  J - 0 , 1 9 -0 . 0 4 - 0 . 07 D A M A T O , A o . 5 9 
S A S S E F: ,  J - 0 . 1 8 -0 . 0 4 - 0 . 1 2 A B D N O R r J o . 63 
S T A r F O F; [I , R -0 . 1 7 0 . 0 6 0 . 4 6 M U R K O W S l\ I  o . 6 4 
C H A F E E • J -o . 1 6 0 + 0 3 o . 3 8 K A S T E N , F< o . 6 7  
C H U R C H , F - 0 . 1 6 - 0 . 1 7 G A R N r J o . 7 1 0 . 7 8  o . s 0 
F' E R C Y , c - 0 . 1 3 0 . 1 9 o . 5 7 L A X  A L T ' P o .  7 3 0 , 7 9 0 . 8 7 
R A N I1 0 L PH , J - o . 1 3  -0 . 1 6 - 0 . 2 7 G R A S S L E Y r  C 0 , 7 3 
H A T F I E L D r M -o . 1 2 0 . 1 6 0 . 4 2 M C C L U R E • J o . 7 4 0 , 8 3 o . 94 
C A N N O N , H - 0 . 1 2 0 , 0 9 - 0 . 0 7 A R M S T R O N G  o . 7 6 0 . 8 4 0 . 0 1 
S T E W ?1 R T , [I - 0 . 1 1 0 . 0 3 Q U A Y L E r J [I o . s o 
Et E N T S E N , L - 0 . 09 0 . 0 3 0 . 1 2  H U M P H R E Y r G 0 . 0 2 0 . 8 9 o . 7 5 
P R Y O R , D - 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 1 7 H A T C H , 0 0 . 0 2 0 , 6 4 0 + 8 5 
F' A C l\ W O O f1 , R - 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 7 0 . 5 3 M A T T I N G L Y  0 . 8 4 
H E I N Z ,  J - 0 . 0 6 0 . 22 0 . 3 2 D E N T O N • J o . s 6 
E X O N • J - 0 . 06 0 . 2 2  -0 . 02 N I C t\ LE S •  [I o . 9 1 
D I X O N r A - 0 . 0 6 E A S T r J 0 . 9 5 
H O L L I N G S , E - 0 . 0 5 0 . 1 1  H E L M S , J 1 . 00 1 . 00 0 . 0 7 
N U N N • s - 0 . 0 5 0 . 20 0 . 0 8 S Y M M S , S 1 . 0 0 (J'\ 00 
[I LJ R E N B E R G E R - 0 . 0 3 0 + 1 9  0 . 4 4 
T A L M A D G E , H -0 . 0 3 0 . 1 6 
� n i;· n ,  w - 0 . 0 2 -0 . 02 - 0 . 2 2 
I CP SR 
Co d e  
1 9 7 9  
1 0 8* 
1 S 8  
3 2 8  
342 
364 
3 6 5  
41 7* 
1 980  
522* 
6 1 7*  
6 :L6 
649* 
6 9 6* 
Geome t r i c  
Me an 
O . S l 
o .  Sl 
o .  so 
0 .  Sl 
o .  Sl 
0.  so 
0 . 50 
O . S l  
o .  so 
O . S l 
o .  Sl 
o.  so 
TABLE 4 
ROLL CALLS WITH LOW GEOMETRIC MEANS ( <  . 5 1 0 )  
Lib .  
Coo r d .  
0 . 1 9  
-o . 56 
-0 . 3 2 
-0 . 5 9 
-0 . 3 S 
-0 . 2 9 
- 1 . 0 2 
-1 . 04 
0 . 98 
-0 . 44 
-0 . 86 
- 1 .  01 
Midpo int 
0 . 23 
-0 . 48 
-0 . 27 
-0 . S3 
-0 . 28 
-0 . 23 
-1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
1 . 00 
-0 . 3 7 
-0 . 81 
- 1 . 00 
To pic  
He inz : Amd . to  Pr e s s l e r  Amd . , VA 
payment s 
Chil e s : Sub s t .  to J ep sen Amd . ,  
borrow ing for food s t amps 
We icker : L iveab l e  c i t i e s, HUD 
appro priation 
Rando l ph :  Make Energy Mo b il iz a t io n  
Board ful l t ime, Redu ce Pow er Chair 
Byrd,  W .  V a . : Tab l e  Weicker Amd .  t o  
e l iminate Cong . pay r a i s e  
Magnun son : House Abor t ion Amd . ,  
Cont inu ing Approp.  
Mu skie : Tab l e  Do l e  sub .  to  Bo s chw i t z  
amd . , r e s ident ial energy a s s i s t ance 
a l l o c a t io n s  
Pre s s l er : V ie tnam V e terans tr aining 
Be l lmon : Tab l e  Cohen Amd .  redu c ing 
Water Re sour ce s spend ing by $ 500 
m il l io n  
Ho l l ing s : Tabl e S t evens Amd . , C iv il 
S e rv i c e  re t ir ement benef i t s  
Ho l l ings : Table Pryor Amd .  to  Glenn 
amd . , po s t  o f f ice sub s i d ie s 
Su s t a in chair on germanene s s  o f  comm. 
amd .  to f und ing for  draft  °' ·� 
Tab 1 e 4 ( co nt . ) 
FCPSR 
Code 
7 8 1 *  
7 88 
8 5 1  
8 5 2  
854* 
906* 
9 5 3* 
9 5 8* 
1 0 1 0* 
1 98 1  
1 96* 
27 2 
3 20* 
3 6 3* 
41 4* 
428 
507* 
Geome t r i c  
Mean 
o . s o 
o .  51  
0 . 5 1 
0 . 51 
0 . 5 0 
o .  51 
o . s o 
0 .  so 
o . so 
0 . 5 1 
o .  51 
0 . 5 1 
o . so 
0 . 5 1 
o .  51 
o .  51  
Lib . 
Coo r d .  
0 . 9 8 
-0 . 67 
-0 . 3 4 
-0 . 37 
0 . 5 8  
0 .  97  
0 . 9 9  
o .  06 
-0 . 64 
- 1 . 0 3 
-0 . 34 
- 1 . 03 
-0 . 1 9 
-0 . 5 9 
0 . 0 8 
- 1 . 03 
Midpo int 
1 . 00 
-0 . 6 1 
-0 . 26 
-0 . 28 
0 . 5 9 
1 . 00 
1 . 0 0 
0 . 08 
-0 . 6 1 
-1 . 00 
-0 . 2 9 
-1 . 0 0 
-0 . 1 7 
-0 . 56 
0 . 1 4 
- 1 . 00 
To pic  
J ohnston : Tab l e  Cr anston amd .  for  
so l ar pow e r  p l an t  in C a l .  
Chaf f e e : K i l l  Tomb igbee w a t e rw ay 
Do l e : Table H a t f ield  no t ion, nu c l e ar 
w a s t e  
H a t f i e l d : Re con s ider nuc l ear w a s t e  
J av i t s : Tab l e  For d  amd .  on DOE auth .  
regar d ing energy impact a s s i s t ant 
Pre s s l e r : V i etnam V e terans training 
Hef l in : 2% reduct ion in HUD applop 
Agree to  d i s approve uranium s al e s  to 
Ind ia 
Hudd l e ston : increa s e  budget o f  FCIC 
K a s t en : No i s e  Contro l Aba t ement 
H e lms : Tob a c co price support s 
Bo s chw itz : T e l e commun i ca t ions 
dere gul a t ion 
Per cy : Tombigbe e w a t e rw ay 
S tev ens : Pay cap f ederal employees  
H a t f ield : Tab l e  Proxmire Amd .  to  
Baker amd . fore ign a id 
Con f erence report,  fore ign aid b i l l  
* L iberal  and Conserv a t ive Coordina te s Clo ser than 0 . 1 .  -...J 0 
TABLE 5 
ADDITIONAL ROLL CALLS LIBERAL AND CONSERVAT IV E COORDINATES CLOSER THAN 0 . 1  
I CP S R  
Co d e  
1 9 7 9  
8 5  
237 
2 53 
3 8 9  
1 9 80  
5 8 8  
5 9 9  
942 
1 9 8 1  
1 40 
42 9 
45 9 
Geome tr i c  
Me an 
0 . 5 2 
o .  53 
0 . 5 2 
0 . 5 1 
0 . 5 1 
o .  51  
o .  51 
0 . 5 1 
0 . 52 
0 . 5 1 
L ib.  
Coo rd.  
-1 . 0 5 
o .  96 
-1 . 0 5 
0 . 5 9  
0 . 7 0  
o .  96 
0 . 7 9  
0 . 6 1  
0 . 9 5 
-1 . 0 5  
Midpo int 
-1 . 0 0 
1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
0 . 6 3  
o .  7 5 
1 . 0 0 
0 . 83 
0 . 6 6  
1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
To pic  
Ketak nom ina t ion ( Legal Serv ice s 
Corpora t ion ) . S e e  Table 4 
Pro xmire : Reduce Revenue S har ing 
$ 6 84 mil l ion 
Me l cher : Cont inue Amtrak s e rv i ce 
Proxmire : Table Mo rgan amd . , banking 
re gul a t ion 
Co chran : Ra il road abando nment s 
Durkin : A l lo c a t ion o f  f und s to 
s t a t e s,  home pur chase a s s i st ance 
Me l cher : D . C .  airpor t s  
Co chran : r e s c ind m igr a t io n  and 
r efugee a s s i s t ance f unds 
Pro xmire : Amd .  Baker amd . ,  fore ign aid 
Hat f ield : De f en s e  spend ing 
-...J 
I-' 
TABLE 6 
ROLL CALLS WITH H IGH GEOMETRIC MEAN S ( >  . 8 5 0 ,  1 97 9 , 1 9 80 ; > . 8 80 , 1 9 81 )  
ICP S R  Geome tric  L ib .  
cod e  
1 9 7 9  
1 6  
421 
430 
43 2 
47 5 
51 2 
1 9 80  
5 7 4  
5 83 
6 0 9  
7 4 9  
1 0 2 5  
1 9 8 1  
)3 
6 0  
7 1  
Me an Coo r d .  
0 . 8 8 - 1 . 0 0 
0 . 88 -0 . 48 
0 . 8 9  - 1 . 1 6 
0 . 88 - 1 . 04 
0 . 8 5  - 1 . 3 6 
0 . 88 -0 . 8 1 
0 . 90 - 1 . 0 0 
0 . 90 - 1 . 00 
0 . 8 9 -0 . 7 8 
0 . 8 5 -0 . 3 1 
0 . 8 5 -1 . 1 2  
0 . 8 9  - 1 . 1 3 
0 . 89 - 1 . 1 7 
0 . 88 - 1 . 7 1  
Midpo int 
0 . 0 2 
0 . 2 1 
-0 . 08 
-0 . 0 2 
-0 . 1 8  
0 . 1 1  
0 . 1 5  
0 . 2 2 
0 . 2 8 
0 . 37 
-0 . 06 
-0 . 06 
-0 . 08 
-0 . 3 5 
To pic 
F ina l pa s sage,  c lotur e  ru l e s  
F inal pas sage,  appro p .  b i l l  
McC lur e : Amd . Idaho W i l derne s s  Act 
F inal pa s sage,  Idaho W i l derne s s  Act 
McC l ur e : 90% W ind f al l pro f it s  t ax, o i l  
Linow itz nomina t ion 
White  nom ina t ion ( E l  Sal vado r ) 
Final pa s sage, FTC funded for 45 days 
Final pas sage,  co nt inuing approp.  FTC 
J o ne s nomina t ion, j o int chief s 
Byrd, Tab l e  Hatch mo t ion to  r e cons ider 
F a ir Hou s ing 
Chile s :  r e store  fund s,  V e t er an s '  
Me d i c a l  S e rv i c e s  
Reigle : r e store  f und s ,  soc ial s e curity 
min. benet i t s  
Me t z enbaum : r e store fund s ,  youth 
tr aining 
"-J N 
Tab l e  6 ( con t . ) 
ICPSR Geome t r i c  Lib . 
Co d e  Me an Coo r d .  Midpo int To pic  
1 3 1  0 . 9 1 - 1 . 00 0 . 07 Hat f i e l d : Tab l e  Moynihan amd . , s o c i a l  
security benef it s 
1 47 0 . 89 - 1 . 24 -0 . 1 2 Pro xmire : Community Development Fun d s  
1 92 0 . 9 2 - 2 . 0 2  -0 . 5 1 Budge t 
1 9 8 0 . 89 - 1 . 00 0 . 03 Baker : Tab l e  Moynihan amd . to  1 9 81 
ERTA 
207 0 . 89 - 1 . 1 7 -0 . 09 Do l e : Tab l e  Boren amd . ,  low e r  intere s t  
rate s 
208 o .  91  - 1 . 0 9 -0 . 0 5  Durenberger : Tab l e  Reig l e  amd . 
corpo r at e  tax cre d i t s 
222 0 . 90 - 1 . 20 -0 . 1 0 Bradley : t ax s chedul e s  
2 5 9  0 . 9 1 - 1 . 07 -0 . 04 Byrd (WV ) :  Adj ourn 
3 23 0 . 89 - 1 . 00 0 . 0 1 Do l e : Tab l e  Byrd amd . to  Pre s s ler 
amd . , so c i al se cur ity min. bener it s  
334 0 . 88 - 1 . 44 -0. 2 2  Kenne dy : Tab l e  H e lms amd . ,  a rms to 
Chile  
42 5 0 . 90 - 1 . 07 -0 . 03 Hatf ield : Tab l e  Deconc ini amd . , cut s in 
VA budge t  
43 5 0 . 88 - 1 . 00 o . oo S t even s : Tab l e  Moynihan mo t ion, 
cont inuing appropr i a t ions 
441 0 . 90 - 1 . 1 4 -0 . 07 S t even s : Tab l e  Byrd amd . ,  incr e a s e d  
s c ient i f i c  r e s e ar ch fund ing 
444 o .  90 - 1 . 23 -0 . 1 1  S t even s : Tab l e  Ho l l in g s  amd . , $ 148 
mil l ion, extra for ammun i t ion 
446 0 . 88 - 1 . 26 -0 . 1 3 Exon : Increase  $60 mil l ion, for 
mo derniz at ion 
46 2 o .  91  - 1 . 22 -0 . 1 1  Do l e : Tab l e  Me tz enbaum amd . ,  ag ing 
-...J 
w 
Tab l e  6 ( co nt . ) 
ICPSR 
Code 
46 9 
47 3 
484 
485 
486 
487 
488 
Geome tric  
Mean 
0 . 88 
0 . 89 
0 . 92 
0 . 8 9 
0 . 90 
0 . 9 1 
0 . 8 9 
Lib . 
Coo r d .  
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 1 6 
-1 . 56  
- 1 . 1 4 
- 1 . 23 
- 1 . 53 
Midpo int To pic 
0 . 0 1 Byrd : Table Baker subs t . , smal l 
b u s i ne s s  and Federal Re s e rve 
0 . 00 J ohn ston : Amd .  Domenici  amd .  balanced 
budg e t  amd .  inf l at ion 
-0 . 08 Bumpe r s : Ch i l d  care appro p .  
-0 . 2 8 Kennedy : Unempl oyment a s s i s t ance 
-0 . 07 Kenne dy : Head start  
-0 . 1 1 Dodd : l ow in come hous ing 
-0 . 27 Eagl eton : CETA 
"-I 
� 
TABLE 7 
ROLL CALLS WITH L IBERAL AND CONSERVAT IVE COORDINATES 
SEPARATED BY MORE THAN 2 . 5  
ICPSR Geometr i c  L ib .  
Code 
1 9 7 9  
23 
43 
1 3 1  
3 7 7  
47 3 
480 
1 9 8 0  
8 3 0  
831  
83 9 
842 
1 9 8 1  
7 1  
1 92 
21 1 
4 8 5  
4 8 8  
Mean 
o. 7 7  
0 . 7 6 
o .  83 
0 . 7 7  
0 . 7 9 
0 . 7 6 
0 . 7 8  
0 . 84 
0 . 7 9  
o .  7 9  
0 . 8 8 
0 . 92 
0 . 86 
0 . 89 
0 . 89 
Coo r d .  
-1 . 5 5  
- 1 . 5 2  
- 1 . 7 6 
- 1 . 5 2 
- 1 . 60 
- 1 . 57 
-1 . 52 
- 1 . 6 9 
- 1 . 67 
-1 . 6 6 
-1 . 7 1  
-2 . 02 
- 1 . 6 0 
- 1 . 56 
- 1 . 53 
Midpo int 
-0 . 28 
- 0 .  26 
-0 . 38 
-0 . 26 
-0 . 3 0 
- 0 . 2 9  
-0 . 26 
-0 . 3 5 
-0 . 34 
-0 . 3 3  
-0 . 3 5  
-0 . 5 1 l 
-0 . 3 4 
-o . 28 l 
-0 . 27 
To p i c  
Percy : Taiw an 
H e inz : Co un c i l  on Wage and Price 
S t ab i l ity to  spend fun d s  to  moni t or 
federal inf l a t ion po l i cy 
Byrd, VA : T a iw an 
Kreger nom ina t ion (Mexi can a f f a i r s ) 
Bumpers : Sub s t .  to Armstrong Amd .  o i l 
pr i ce d e co nt r o l  and w indf al l pro f it s  
Long : Tab l e  Rib i co f f  Amd . ,  w in d f a l l  
pro f it s  t a x  
McGovern : Tab l e  Co chran Amd .  S choo l  
Lunche s 
Boren : S cho o l  Lunche s ,  Farm Labor 
Contract Act 
Wallop : e xclude some mining f rom ERISA 
Bor en : Smal l bu s ine s s  exempt ion, OSHA 
See  Tab l e  6 
Bradl ey : Tax cut 
See Tab l e  6 
'-I 
\.Jl 
I CPSR 
Code 
1 9 7 9  
3 7  
6 0  
1 0 1  
1 1 0  
1 7 4  
17  5 
221 
230 
300 
305 
3 06 
3 0 9  
3 47 
349 
TABLE 8 
ROLL CALL S WITH MIDPOINTS WITH IN 0 . 1  OF MEAN MIDPOINT 
Geome t r i c  
Mean 
0 . 8 1  
o .  7 7  
o .  7 6  
0 . 58 
0 . 6 8 
0 . 7 2 
0 . 7 2 
0 . 52 
0 .  7 4  
0 . 7 6 
o .  7 5 
0 . 6 1 
0 . 5 9 
0 . 66 
Lib . 
Coord.  
- 1 . 41 
-1 . 2 5 
- 1 . 23 
-0 . 50 
-0 . 7 6 
-0 . 96 
- 1 . 03 
-0 . 3 5 
-1 . 0 9 
- 1 . 23 
-1 . 1 6 
-o . 57 
-o . 53 
-0 . 7 2  
Midpo int 
-0 . 2 1 
-0 . 2 2 
-0 . 2 1 
-0 . 21 
-0 . 20 
- 0 . 22 
-0 . 22 
-0 . 2 2 
-0 . 22 
-0 . 2 1 
-0 . 2 2 
-0 . 21 
-0 . 2 1 
-0 . 2 1 
To pic  
Long : Tabl e Armstrong amd . , income t ax 
cut s 
Ro th : Redu ce s pend ing and cut t axe s 
Chur ch : Table H e lms Amd . , UN fund ing 
Hud dl e ston : Tab l e  Co chran Amd . ,  SBA 
intere s t  r at e  
Armstro ng : Amd .  HUD autho r iz a t io n  t o  
t ighten income r e s t r i ct ions on pub l i c  
hou s ing 
Garn : Exempt nonpro f it s  from labo r 
s t andar d s  
H e lms : Amd .  Mcgovern amd . ,  food s t amps 
Mathia s : Co l l ect ive Barga ining, 
Empl oy e e s  Panama Canal Commi s s ion 
Be l lmon : Amend Mu skie Amd .  to conform 
approp.  to  budg e t  
Ro th : Redu ce s pend ing and c u t  t axe s 
Armst rong : Reduce spend ing and cut 
taxe s 
Mu skie : Tab l e  Bumper s  Amd . , 2 . 5% 
acro s s  the bo ard spend ing cut 
Pas s  commit t e e  amd . ,  IDA r e s t r i c t ions 
on V ie tnam, Egypt , Sudan 
Pa s s  comm i t t e e  amd . IDA re s t r i c t ions,  
Taiw an 
'-I 
0\ 
Tab l e  8 ( co nt . ) 
I CPSR 
Co de 
3 6 1  
428 
4S 9 
1 9 8 0  
S 2 0  
S S S  
S82 
6 06 
6 1 S  
6 37 
6 6 9  
6 8 1  
7 SO 
7 7 4  
804 
8uS 
809 
Geome t r i c  
Mean 
0 . 6 0  
0 . 80 
0 . 7 4 
0 . 8 1 
0 . 7 6 
o .  7 2 
0 . 7 0 
0 . 6 4 
0 . 6 2 
0 . 6 0 
0 . 7 S 
0 . 7 4 
0 . 6 8 
0 . 6 S  
0 . 6 8  
0 . 6 8  
Lib . 
Coo r d .  
-0 . S3 
-1 . 41 
-1 . 0 1 
-1 . 3 1  
- 1 . 1 7  
-0 . 9 3 
-0 . 83 
-0 . 6 2 
-0 . S6 
-o . so 
- 1 . 1 2 
-0 . 9 9 
-0 . 7 S 
-0 . 6 S  
-0 . 7 8 
-0 . 7 3 
Midpo int 
-0 . 2 1 
-0 . 20 
-0 . 2 1 
-0 . l S  
-0 . 1 4 
-0 . l S 
-0 . 1 4 
-0 . l S 
-0 . l S 
-0 . l S  
-0 . 1 6 
-0 . 1 4 
-0 . l S 
- 0 . l S  
-0 . 1 6 
-0 . l S 
To p i c  
Pa s s  f o r e i gn a i d  b i l l  
Do l e : O i l  w indfal l pro f i t s  t ax 
Bradl ey : O i l  w indf al l pro f i t s  t ax 
Byrd : Tab l e  Tower amd .  S a l t  II 
S impson : FTC 
Budget r e so l ut ion w i th Mu skie 
sub s t itute s 
Baker : Tab l e  Byrd mo t ion to  r e co n s ider 
f a i l e d  c l o t ur e  vote 
Ho l l ings : Tab l e  Thurmond amd .  
incr eas ing s pend ing f o r  ve terans,  
decreas ing for soc ial s e rv i c e s  
S c hw e iker : Redu ce Feder al  Re s e rv e s  
F inal pas sage,  Central Ameri can a i d  
Proximire : Re con s i d er Do l e  amd . , w age­
price gu ide l ine s 
Moynihan : Tab l e  J ep sen amd . ,  
exempt ions f rom Dav i s-Bacon 
Bent sen : Tab l e  Arms trong amd . ,  tax 
indexing 
Culver : Tab l e  Wal lop amd . fund ing ABM 
Tower : Table Exon amd .  War Pow e r s  
Re solut ion 
Glenn : Tab l e  Tow er Sub s t . to  Gl enn 
amd .  B- 1 -..J -..J 
Tab l e  8 ( cont . ) 
ICPSR 
Co de 
8 1 0  
835  
8 53 
9 1 1  
1 98 1  
6 0  
20 2 
207 
447 
Geome t r i c  
Me an 
o .  7 5 
0 . 7 5  
0 . 51 
0 . 5 8 
0 . 8 9 
0 . 7 8 
0 . 8 9 
0 . 7 6 
Lib . 
Coo r d .  
- 1 . 0 1 
- 1 . 1 4  
-0 . 26 
-0 . 44 
- 1 . 1 7 
-o . 81  
- 1 . 1 7 
-0 . 7 1 
Midpo int 
-0 . 1 5  
-0 . 1 6 
-0 . 1 5 
-0 . 1 5  
-0 . 08 
-0 . 1 0 
-0 . 0 9 
-0 . 0 9 
To p i c  
Glenn : Tab l e  Tow er Sub s t .  to G l enn 
amd .  B-1 
Byrd : Tab l e  H e lm s  appeal rul ing of 
cha i r  
H a t f ield : Nu c l e ar W a s t e  
J ohn ston : Table Cohen Amd . , 
Hydro e l e c t r i c  Pro j e ct ,  Maine 
Reigl e :  r e s t o r e  f un d s ,  so c .  s e c . min. 
benef it s 
S c hmit t :  Tax b i l l  
Do l e : Tab l e  Boren amd . , lower inter e s t  
rat e s  
Glenn : Add $ 7 5  mil l io n  f o r  bat t l e  
group i n  Ind i an Ocean 
-.....J 
00 
ICP8R 
Cod e  
1 9 7 9  
1 3 5  
200 
237 
302 
406 
504 
1 980  
So l 
5 9 9  
6 1 7  
7 01 
7 0 2  
7 0 8  
7 6 2  
Geometric  
Me an 
0 . 6 0  
0 . 56 
0 .  53 
o .  67 
0 . 67 
0 . 5 5 
0 . 6 2  
o .  51 
o .  50 
0 .  56 
0 . 5 9 
0 . 63 
o .  56 
TABLE 9 
MIDPOINT PLACED AT MINORITY END 
L ib.  
Coo rd.  
0 . 9 1 
0 . 93 
o .  96 
0 . 88 
0 . 88 
0 . 94 
0 . 87  
o .  96  
0 . 9 8 
0 . 9 2 
0 . 89 
0 . 87 
0 . 91 
Midpo int 
1 . 0 0 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 0 0 
1 . 0 0 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
To p i c  
Hart : D e l e t e  f unds F-1 8 
Mel cher : Add $ 200M, so il  con s e rva t io n  
serv i ce 
Pro xmire : Reduce Revenue S har ing $ 6 84 
mil l ion 
Exon : Sub s t .  Ho l l ings Amd . ,  defen s e  
s pending 
Hatf i e l d : K i l l  MX 
Sust ain chair on Bumpers  Amd . , Ga so ho l 
F ina l pa s sage,  mo tor veh i c l e  s a f e ty 
Durk in : A l l o cat ion of f und s t o  s tate s, 
have pur cha se  a s s i s t ance 
B e l lrnon : Tab l e  Cohen Amd .  reduc ing 
Water Re sour ce s s pend ing by $ 500 
m il l ion 
Warner : Tab l e  Comm. Amd . ,  co nc ientious 
obj ectors  
Cran s ton : Tab l e  Byrd mo t io n  to  
recons ider 417 0 1  
Hatf ield : Tab l e  Nunn amd . ,  draft 
regi strat ion f unds 
Moynihan : Pe l l  grant s t o  e duca t ion 
" 
·l.O 
Tab l e  9 ( cont . ) 
I CPSR 
Code 
7 81 
87 9 
8 86 
8 8 9  
906 
953 
97 9 
9 8 4  
1 0 0 2  
1 9 8 1  
7 3  
7 5  
7 6  
9 5  
1 96 
Geome t r i c  
Mean 
0 . 50 
0 . 64 
o .  57 
0 . 5 8 
0 .  51 
0 . 5 0 
0 . 7 0 
0 . 64 
0 . 7 1 
0 . 6 4 
0 . 6 2 
0 . 60 
0 . 53 
o .  51 
Lib .  
Coo rd.  
0 . 9 8 
o .  86 
0 .  91  
0 . 90 
0 .  97  
0 . 9 9  
0 . 82 
0 . 86 
0 . 82 
-1 . 1 6 
- 1 . 1 4 
- 1 . 1 3 
-1 . 06 
-1 . 03 
Midpo int 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
To p i c  
Magnun so n :  Table H e lms amd . , Mt . St . 
H e l en s  d i s a s t e r  r e l ief 
Byrd (WV ) :  Tab l e  Me l cher mo t ion on 
chair rul ing regarding c l o tur e  
Byrd ( WV ) :  Tab l e  Me t z enbaum appe d t o  
chair r u l e  on McGovern amd. , s t r i p  
mining.  
Ford : Tab l e  Me tzenbaum mo t io n  to  
reco n s ider,  s t r ip m ining 
Pre s s l er : V ietnam V e t erans Tra ining 
Hef l in :  Reduce HUD approp.  by 2% 
Ado pt Co nference report,  r a ilroad 
regu l a t ion 
Weicker : Re connnit S t ate-J u s t ice 
approp.  
S t af f ord : Agree to  sub s t itute, Haz ar do u s  
Wa s t e  Cleanup 
Ho l l ing s : Reduce f unds,  Fede r al co s t  
o f  l iv ing a d j u s tment s 
Proxmire : Reduce s pend ing beyond 
approp.  comm. recommenda t ion 
Proxmir e : Re store f unds Ex-In Bank 
Deconcini : Table Percy amd . ,  African 
Development B ank 
K a s t en : No i se Contro l Aba t ement 
00 0 
Tab l e  9 ( cont . ) 
I CPSR 
Code 
241  
2 47 
2 / 0  
2 7 4  
3 20 
4 5 9  
4 9 7  
5 0 7  
Geome t r i c  
Me an 
0 . 6 4 
0 . 7 1  
0 . 5 2 
0 . 54 
o .  51  
0 .  51  
0 . 6 0  
0 .  51 
L ib .  
Coord.  
- 1 . 1 6 
-1 . 22 
-1 . 06 
- 1 . 07 
-1 . 03 
-1 . 0 5 
- 1 . 1 3 
-1 . 03 
Midpo int 
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
To p i c  
He inz : Indu s t r ial  Dev . B ank s ,  
po l l u t ion control 
Kennedy : Bu s ine s s  meal  a l low ance 
H e lms : Table Quay l e  amd . , sugar pr ice 
s upport s 
Inouye : Table Humphr ey amd . ,  sugar 
pr ice suppo r t s 
Bo s chw itz : T e l e coillllluni c a t ion s  
deregu l a t ion 
Hatf ield : Defense  s pend ing 
Agr ee to conf erence r epo r t ,  
Agr i cul ture appro p .  
Agree to  co nference report,  For e ign 
Aid approp.  
co I-' 
ICPSR 
Co de 
1 9 7 9  
8 5  
9 2  
1 0 5  
1 20 
1 41 
1 5 9  
1 6 0  
249 
2 53 
3 21 
3 6 6  
3 86 
3 90 
41 7 
47 9 
Geom e t r i c  
Me an 
0 . 5 2 
0 . 5 9 
0 . 6 5 
0 . 6 0  
0 . 6 9 
0 . 56 
0 . 6 6 
0 . 6 5 
0 . 52 
0 . 6 8 
0 . 6 7 
o .  57 
0 . 52 
0 . 50 
0 . 6 9 
TABLE 1 0  
MIDPOINTS PLACED AT MAJ ORITY END 
L ib .  
Coo r d .  
-1 . 0 5  
- 1 . 1 2 
- 1 . 1 7 
-1 . 1 4  
-1 . 21  
-1 . 1 0 
-1 . 1 8 
- 1 . 1 8 
- 1 . 0 5 
- 1 . 20 
-1 . 1 9  
-1 . 1 1 
-1 . 06 
- 1 . 0 2 
- 1 . 21  
Midpo int 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
-1 . 0 0 
- 1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
To p i c  
Kut a k  nom ina t ion ( Legal Serv ice Cor p . ) 
Hudd l e ston : Tab l e  Thurmond Amd . 
A l coho l i sm Warning Lab l e  on Bo t t l e s  
F inal pas sage,  S t a t e  De p t .  auth. 
Eag l e ton : w itho l d  funds f rom s t a t e s 
f a i l ing t o  admini s ter child 
f ee d ing progr ams 
Lugar : G a s oho l 
J ep sen : Amd .  IDA bil l 
Weicker : germanene s s  o f  S tenn i s  amd .  o n  
int e r e s t  r a t e  or d i s a s t er loans 
Byrd (WV ) Tab l e  Wei cker amd. 
adj ourn. 
Me l cher : Amd .  Leahy Amd .  con t inue 
Amtr ak 
Brown nomina t ion 
Agr e e  to  s a l ary incr e a s e s for member 
o f  Congre s s  
J ohn s ton : con cern in Ho u s e  amd . ,  
d e t a i l s  o f  ant itrust reg.  
S t ewart : banking regula t ion 
Mu skie : Table Do l e  Sub . to Bo s chw itz 
amd . ,  r e s ident ial  energy a l l o c a t io n s  
S t evens : Tab l e  De conc ini Amd .  on IRS 
info . d i s cl o sure to f ederal agencie s CXl N 
Tab l e  1 0  ( co nt . ) 
I CPSR 
Code 
1 9 8 0  
5 2 2  
5 23 
524 
5 5 2  
6 3 8  
642  
6 50 
6 51 
6 94 
6 9 6  
7 1 0  
7 1 4  
7 40 
7 8 2  
7 90 
Ge ome tric  
Mean 
0 . 5 1 
0 . 54 
0 . 6 2 
0 . 7 4 
o .  7 2  
o .  56 
0 . 52 
0 .  56 
0 .  53 
0 . 50 
0 . 5 8 
0 . 5 5 
0 . 57 
0 . 6 8 
0 . 6 5 
Lib.  
Coo r d .  
-1 . 0 4 
- 1 . 0 9 
- 1 . 1 8 
- 1 . 30 
- 1 . 27 
- 1 . 1 2 
-1 . 06 
- 1 . 1 1 
- 1 . 07 
- 1 . 0 1 
- 1 . 1 4 
- 1 . 1 1 
-1 . 1 3 
-1 . 24 
-1 . 20 
Midpo int 
-1 . 0 0 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
-1 . 0 0 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 0 0 
-1 . 0 0 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
To p i c  
Pre s s l e r : V ie tnam V e t e r an s  tra ining 
Cran s ton : Sub s t .  B e l lmo n amd . ,  VA and 
HEW coord ina t ion, nur s ing home care 
Mu skie : Tab l e  Cran s to n  amd . 1 5% 
incr ease  GI  educat ion bene f i t s  
Lev in : FTC . veto  
Ho l l ings : Table Wei cke r Amd .  
incre a s ing health f und ing 
H e f l in : Redu ce Int ' l .  Aff air s budget,  
incre a s e  J u s t ice 
Pryor : Amd .  Gl enn Amd . Congre s s ional 
budget 
Ho l l ings : Tab l e  Gl enn Amd . ,  po s t al 
sub s idie s 
C l o ture o n  f un d s  for d r af t  r e g i s t ra t ion 
Sust ain chair, germanene s s, 
cons c ient io u s  obj e c t o r s  
Nunn : r e duce appropria t ions draf t ing 
r e g i s t rat ion forms 
Hatf ield : Tabl e draft  r e g i s t ra t ion 
Hudd l e ston : innnigr at ion quo t a  
S u s t ain chair that Cran sLon amd . ,  
so l ar power in CA v io l ated budget 
r e so l u t ion 
Magnun son : br ing appro p .  b i l l  w ithin 
budge t ce i l ing 
00 w ·  
Tab 1 e 1 0 ( co nt . ) 
ICPSR 
Code 
880 
887 
888 
9 1 5  
1 000 
1 0 1 4  
1 9 8 1  
3 3  
63  
1 1 0  
1 90 
26 3 
2 96 
3 55 
3 7 7  
42 9 
495 
Geome t r i c  
Mean 
0 . 53 
0 . 63 
0 . 63 
0 . 6 7 
0 . 7 1 
0 . 66 
0 . 5 7 
0 . 5 8 
0 . 6 5 
0 . 52 
0 . 5 9 
0 . 6 2  
0 . 6 4 
0 . 5 9 
0 . 52 
0 . 5 5 
Lib .  
Coo r d .  
-1 . 0 8 
- 1 . 1 8 
- 1 . 1 8 
- 1 . 2 4 
- 1 . 28  
-1 . 21 
0 . 8 9 
0 . 8 8 
o .  83 
0 . 94 
0 . 8 8 
0 . 85 
0 . 84 
0 . 8 7  
0 . 9 5 
0 . 9 1 
Midpo int 
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
-1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
- 1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
1 . 0 0  
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
To p i c  
C l o t ur e : s t r ip m ining 
Nunn : Tab l e  Me tz enbaum mo t io n  to 
reco n s i de r, s t r i p  m ining 
Warner : Tab l e  Me tz enbaum appeal 
Byrd (WV ) Federal pay ce il ing 
J ep sen : Re s t o re $ 200 m i l l ion, 
per sonne l ,  mil i t ary 
Byrd : reque s t  a t t endance of members  
Pas sage : Debt  L imit  Incr ease  
McClure : Re store fund s s trategic  
P e t ro l eum Re se rve 
Domenici : Tab l e  Proxmire amd . , 
b a l anced budg e t  1 982 
H e lms : redu c e  f unding hand i capped 
Pas sage : Mil itary pay increase s 
Pro xmire : out s ide e arned income, 
e l e c t ed or appo inted member s of gov ' t .  
Pas s : agricul ture appro p .  aid b i l l  
Percy : Amd . Percy amd . o n  agr i cul tural 
emb argo s 
Proxmire : Amd .  Baker amd . ,  foreign aid 
Agree to conference r e po r t ,  Expt . 
Admin. A c t  
(X) 
� 
TABLE 11 
MONTE CARLO RESULTS FOR SENATORS AND UTILITY FUNCTION 
Run 
A 8 = 15 . 00 } 9 7 roll call midpoints generated 
B S = 2 2 . 50 at midp oints of  adj acent s enators . 
C S = 7 . 50 Three lib eral coordinates per 
D S = 18 . 25 midp oint . Total of  2 9 1  roll 
E S =  1 1 . 75 calls . 
F S = 15 . 0  Liberal coordina tes and midpoints 
uncorre lated 
G S = 1 5 . 0  } Midpoin ts throughout but concen-
H S = 15 . 0  trated in center . Lib eral coordi-
I S = 1 5 . 0  nates generated by random proces s . 
Linear Ut ility } Roll calls identical to  
Perf e c t  Vot ing A-E 
50 S enators , S = 15 . 0  
R
2 S t d . Error of  
Regress ion 
. 9 9 0  . 04 7  
. 9 9 0  . 04 7  
. 980 . 0 68 
. 99 0  . 0 48 
. 988 . 05 3  
. 987 . 055 
. 988 . 05 4  
. 986 . 05 7  
. 987 . 055 
. 980 . 0 6 9  
. 9 23 . 134 
. 9 9 1  . 0 47 
* With Perfect Voting , the es t imate of  S exp lo des as itera t ions cont inue . 
Recovered S 
16 . 4 7 
2 7 . 4 6 
8 .  7 2  
20 . 5 3 
12 . 45 
12 . 45 
1 7  . 9 6 
19 . 87 
19 . 8 7  
1 1 . 7 5  
* 
16 . 88 
00 \Jl 
TABLE 1 2  
MONTE CARLO RESULTS FOR MIDPOINTS 
S t d .  Error o f  Root Me an Mean Numbe r  o f  
Run R2 Regre s s ion Sq. Error Error Ro l l  C al l s  
Unf i l t ered 
A • 9 7  4 . 07 3  . 0 7 4  . 006  2 8 8* 
B . 9 8 1  • 063 • 062 • 007 2 86* 
c . 93 0  . 1 24 . 1 27 • 0 1 3  2 9 1  
D . 9 7 9  . 066 . 068 . 008 2 8 7* 
E • 9 6 7  . 0 85 . 0 85 . 004 2 9 1  
F • 537 . 066 • 0 9 1 - . 001 286 
G • 7 47 . 1 7 2 . 1 8 8  - . 003 283 
H • 6 53 . 202 • 230 . 001  283 
I . 5 98  . 2 1 8  . 243 - . 01 0  283 
L inear U t il ity • 9 53 . 1 02 . 1 0 5  . 003 2 9 1  
Perfect  V o t ing . 90 9  . 1 41 . 1 44 - . 002 2 9 1  
5 0  S enator s • 6 7 6  • 268 . 3 30 - . 1 7 9  2 9 1  
F i l tered 
A . 9 7 0  • 07 3 . 07 3  . 004 2 b 9  
B . 9 7 9  . 060 . 06 2  . 006 260 
c . 93 3  . 1 1 8  . 1 2 2  . 0 1 5  2 1 5  
D • 9 7 7  . 064 . 06 6  . 00 5  267  
E • 9 6 5  . 0 84 . 0 85  . 003 27 6 
F • 538 . 06 6  . 0 91  - . 001 2 8 5  
G . 8 9 5  . 1 03 . 1 1 0  - . 002 2b7  
H • 8 96 . 1 0 5  . 1 08 . 008 264 
I . 847 . 1 2 5  . 1 3 0  - . 002 2 b 3  
L inear U t i l i t y  • 9 52 . 0 97 . 1 01 . 0 07 2 7 7  
Per f e ct V o t ing N too smal l for analy s i s  • 
50 S enat o r s  • 7 24 . 240 . 2 82 - . 133  2 1 2  
* D if f e r s  f rom 2 9 1  be cau s e  ro l l  c al l s  w i t h  l e s s  than 2 . 5% mino r ity no t 
analyz e d .  
00 °' 
TABLE 1 3  
MONTE CARLO RESULTS FOR LIBERAL COORDINATES 
S t d .  Error o f  Roo t  Mean Me an 
Run R2 Regr e s s ion Sq . Error Error 
Unf i l t ered 
A • 7 67 • 2 50 . 2 6 9  . 0 1 2  
B . 7 09 • 276 . 3 01 - . 0 1 3  
c . 7 92 . 23 8  • 2 52 . 0 2 5  
D • 7 47 . 260 • 276 - . ooo 
E . 8 1 7  . 2 23 . 2 5 1  . 024 
F . 37 5  . 1 50 . 1 6 2  - . 028  
G . 7 43 . 26 2  . 27 8  - . 042 
H . 7 48 • 27 2 . 2 94 - . 0 1 4  
I . 6 9 5  • 27 4 . 3 0 5  - . 0 1 4  
Linear U t i l ity . 808 . 22 9  . 2 44 - . 0 7 7  
Per f e ct V o t ing • 93 0 . 1 3 8  . 40 8  . 3 7 3  
50 S e nator s . 4 97 . 37 1  . 433 - . 1 41 
F i l t ered 
A . 86 2  . 1 82 . 1 85  - . 03 1  
B . 867 . 1 7 8  . 1 97 - . 0 83 
c . 8 5 5  . 1 97 . 2 1 0  . 0 21  
D . 8 84 . 1 6 9  . 1 82 - . 060 
E . 8 7 4  . 1 80 . 1 93 - . 0 1 4  
F • 3 80 . 1 44 . 1 57 - . 030 
G . 8 56  . 1 85  . 1 9 5  - . 03 7  
H . 87 0  . 1 90 . 1 9 5  - . 03 5  
I . 8 3 5  . 1 96 • 2 1 1  - . 009 
Linear Ut il ity • 838 . z05 . 2 1 6  - . 0 7 0  
Per f e c t  V o t ing N . A .  
5 0  S enator s  . � 1 1  . 2 28  . 2 50 - . 0 9 8  
Number o f  
Ro l l  Cal l s  
288 
286 
2 9 1  
287 
2 9 1  
286 
283 
283 
283 
2 9 1  
2 9 1  
2 9 1  
2 6 9  
260 
27 5 
267 
2 / 6  
2 8 5  
2 6 7  
264 
2 6 3  
2 7 7  
2 1 2 
CXl "' 
TABLE 1 4  
MONTE CARLO RESULTS FOR S PREAD S 
S t d .  Error o f  Roo t  Mean 
Run R2 Regre s s ion Sq . Error 
Unf i l t ered 
A . 3 82  . 1 23 . 2 S S  
B . 2 9 S  . 1 3 1  • 2 9 6  
c . 3 3 8  . 1 2 9  . 2 23 
D • 343 . 1 27 . 26 6  
E . 3 7 9  . 1 2 S . 23 4  
F . S36 . 1 08 . 1 4S 
G • 7 S3 . 1 89  . 1 9 8  
H . 829 . 1 63 . 1 74 
I . 8 1 0  . 1 6 3  . 1 7 6  
L inear Ut i l ity • 069  . 1 S4 • 233 
Per t e e t  V o t ing . 034* . •  1 S 6 . 408  
SO Senat o r s  . 1 S4 . 1 47 • 3 S3 
F i l tered 
A . 3 34 . 1 1 8  . 1 7 4  
B . 3 14  . 1 24 . 1 9 9 
c • 3 27 . 1 2 9  . 1 9 8  
D • 3 23 . 1 23 . 1 8 1  
E • 3 7  4 . 1 23 . 1 7 6  
F . 5 4S . 1 07 . 1 40 
G . 8 1 8  . 1 S3 . 1 6 1  
H . 843 . 1 49 . 1 60 
I . 8 2 1  . l SO . 1 6 1  
Linear U t i l ity . 07 6  . 1 49 . 2 1 8  
Per f e c t  V o t ing N . A .  
SO S enator s . 1 49 . l SO . 3 03 
* The corr e l at ion i s  -0 . 1 841 . 
Me an 
Error 
- . 006 
. 0 20 
- . 0 1 2  
. 008  
- . 020 
. 0 27 
. 03 8  
• O S l  
. oo s  
. 080 
- . 3 7 5  
- . 038 
. 03 S  
. 0 90 
- . 006 
. 06 S  
• 0 1 7  
. 02 9  
• 03 S 
. 043 
- . 007 
. 07 3  
- . 03 S  
Numbe r  o f  
Ro l l  Ca l l s 
2 8 8  
2 8 6  
2 9 1  
287  
2 9 1  
286 
283 
2 83 
283  
2 9 1  
2 9 1  
2 91  
2 6 9  
260 
2 t S  
267  
27 6 
2 8 S  
26 7  
264 
26 3 
2 7 7  
2 1 2  
00 00 
TABLE 1 5  
AV ERAGE OF STANDARD ERRORS ESTIMATED BY NOMINATE 
L ibe r a l  
Y e ar and Cut o f f  Lev e l  S enat o r s  Midpo int s Co ordina t e s  N* 
1 0% - 1 97 9  . 049 . 0 93 . 1 7 9  4 1 2 / 3 7 9  
1 9 80 . 03 9  . 1 1 2  . 1 87 3 90 / 3:L9 
1 9 81 . 049 . 1 06 . 1 7 2  3 5 4/ 283 
2 . 5% - 1 9 8Uc . 049 . 1 3 5  . 2 53 41 5 / 248 
1 9 81 . 049 . 1 3 1  • 2 1 4  3 9 7 / 2 50 
* F ir s t  number i s  t o t a l  ro l l  c al l s .  S e co nd i s  r o l l c al l s  e s t imat e d  w i thout 
con s t r aint s .  F i gur e s  in t ab l e  for ro l l  cal l s  r e f e r  to only e s t imat e s  
w i thout con s tr a int s .  Output o f  s t andard erro r s  w a s  no t added t o  NOMINATE 
for runs no t in tabl e .  
c S e e  Tab l e  1 7 . 
00 � 
TABLE 1 6  
STANDARD ERRORS ESTIMATED BY NOMINATE : 1 9 80 DATA 
U S ING 1 97 9  SENATOR COORDINATES AS STARTS 
N* 
Midpo int : 
Me an S t d .  Error 
S t d .  Dev. of S t d .  Erro r s  
Min imum S t d .  Error 
M�x imum S t d .  Error 
R - S t a r t  S t d .  Error and 
F ina l S t d .  Error 
R2 - Final S t d .  Error on 
Quadrat i c  o f  Coo r dina t e s  
Liberal  Coordina t e : 
Me an S t d .  Error 
S t d .  Dev. of S t d .  Erro r s  
M�n imum S t d .  Error 
R - S t art S t d .  Error and 
Final S t d .  Error 
R2 - Final S t d .  Error on 
Quadr at i c  of Coordina t e s  
A l l  Con s t r a ined 
Ro l l  C al l s  
E l imina ted 
S t art F inal 
3 1 4  
. 1 2 2 
. 1 46 
. 03 3  
1 . 47 0  
. 2 2 5  
. 1 44 
• 0 9 2 
. 8 82 
. 46 5  
. 7 36 
. 4 56  
3 1 4  
. 1 08  
. 1 32 
. 0 2 9  
1 .  226 
. 2 3 2  
. 1 48 
. 07 7  
Only Ro l l  Cal l s  
w ith Con strained 
Midpo int s E l imina ted 
S t art Final 
3 46 
. 1 1 5  
. 1 41 
. 03 3  
1 . 47 0  
. � 84 
. 46 5  
N . A .  
3 46 
. 1 0 2  
. 1 27 
. 0 28  
1 .  226  
·\.O 
0 
9 1  
TABLE 17 
SUMMARY OF U . S .  SENATE ESTIMATES , 19 7 9 -81 
Median Senator** Average 
Y ear and Geometric Mean Sen . Mean Mean Lib . Geometric*** 
Cuto ff Level Mean Name Coordinate Coordinate Midpoint Coordinate N* Mean 
10% - 19 7 9  30 . 2 7  . 6 5 4  Exon - . 30 - . 25 - . 2 1 - . 6 7  412 /3 7 9  . 65 9  
1980 24 . 03 . 6 48 P roxmire - . 26 - . 22 - . 15 - . 5 9  390 /329 . 650 
1981 2 4 . 7 2  . 686 Press ler + . 05 + . 0 2 - . 09 - . 5 0  354/ 283 . 6 73 
5 %  - 19 7 9  19 . 98 . 6 63 Bentsen - . 12 - . 0 9  - . 02 - . 5 1  4 15 /344 . 65 7  
2 . 5% - 19 79 18 . 87 . 665 Pryor - . 09 - . 0 6  - . 0 1  - . 52 4 15 /2 74 . 6 43 
1980a 14 . 63 . 6 6 7  Stone + . 00 + . 0 2 + . 08 - . 4 7 415 / 2 78 . 634 
1980b 16 . 5 1 . 668 Packwood + . 06 + . 08 + . 13 - . 42 4 15 / 286 . 6 42 
1980c 13 . 5 1 . 6 6 4  Johnston - . 19 - . 16 - . 08 - . 65 4 15 / 2 48 . 634 
1981 15 . 10 . 6 9 4  Pressler + . 33 + . 22 + . 0 5  - . 4 7  3 9 7 /2 5 0  . 65 7  
0 . 5% - 19 79 12 . 69 . 6 7 1  Heinz + . 05 + . 02 + . 08 - . 55 415 / 2 7 4  . 6 43 
a , b , c  Three partially overlapping runs for 1980 dat a .  Three runs together span all 1980 data . 
* See not e  to Tab le 15 .  
** Coordinates for the "four" median s enat ors in 19 79 dif fered by at mos t  0 . 0 9  on any s ingle run . S imilarly , 
the maximum difference in 1980 runs was 0 . 05 . 
*** Average o f  roll call geometric means for uncons trained roll calls . 
TABLE 1 8  
PERCENTAGE O F  INDIV IDUAL V OTES CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
Mo d e l  
Year and 
Cuto f f  Lev e l  Party ( N  Dem. ) Lib . -Cons . ( N  L ib . ) Midpo int 
1 97 9  - 1 0% 57 .  5% 58 7 1 . 0% 64 7 9 . 2% 
1 9 7 9  - 5% 66 . 8  5 8  70 . 5  63 80 . 0  
1 97 9  - 2 . 5% 66 . 1  58  7 0 . 0  64 8u . 3  
1 9 7 9  - o .  5% 65 . 3  5 8  69 . 7  70  81 . 1  
1 980 - 1 0% 67 . 9  58  7 0 . 4  6 1  7 8 . 7  
1 9 80* - 2 . 5% 66 . 5  5 8  69 . 3  6 5  80 . 7  
1 Y8 1  - 1 0% 7 4 . 2 46 7 5 . 1  41 81 . 7 
1 9 81 - 2 . 5% 7 1 . 4  46 7 2 . 3  41 83 . 3  
* Average over 3 run s  that s pan ent ire data s e t .  F igure s in this  t able 
r e f er to all  ro l l  cal l s .  ( E s t imate s  can b e  constr aine a . ) 
\0 N 
TABLE 1 9  
AV ERAGE CHANGE IN POS ITION 1 9 7 9-81* 
GROUPS OF N INE SENATORS, ORDERED BY 1 97 9  POS ITI ON 
Group Range Change 
-1 . 0  -- -. 5 5  . 0 23 
- . 52 -- - . 3 8  . 03 3  
- . 36 - - - . 25 . 05 5  
- . 20 -- - . 1 2 . 2 80 
- . 1 0  -- - . 02 . 209  
- . 0 2 -- + . 1 5  . 2 50 
+ . 1 5  -- + . 30 . 3 2 5  
+ . 3 0 -- +. 5 2  . 3 3 2  
+ .  56 - - +1 . 0  . 0 98 
TOTAL -1 . 0 -- +1 . 0  . 1 82 
* Based on 2 . 5% Cut o f f  Level Run s 
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Figure 1 :  Utility Function o f  a Vo ter Loca t e d  a t  -1 . 0  
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NOMINATE . NOMINAL THREE STEP ESTIMATION 
P reliminary Proce s s ing of 
Raw Roll Call Votes 
l 
Obt ain Senator S tarts 
by Mat rix Decomposit i on 
' 
Ob t ain Roll Call S t arts 
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i 
Global Iterat ion Technique 
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Figure 3 :  True and Recovered Senator Coordinates : Perfe c t  Voting 
98 SENATORS 
True 
1 . 000 - I 
I 
0 . 867 -
0 . 733 -
0 . 600 -
0 . 467 -
0 . 333 -
0 . 200 -
0 . 067 -
- 0 . 067 -
-0 . 200 - I  
I 
I 
-0. 333 - I  
I 
I 
-0. 467 - I  
I 
I 
-0 . 600 - I  
I 
I 
- 0 . 733 - I  
I 
I 
-0. 867 - I  
I 
I 
- 1 . 000 - I  
2 
• • • 2 
• 2 
2 •  
2 • 
• 2 
3 • 
· - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
• 22 
' I I I I 
- 2 . 479 - 1 . 5 1 4 -0. 499 
- 2 . 022 - 1 . 007 
• 2 • 2 • 
2 • 
* 2 • 22 • •  
2 • 2 
1 8 -Jun-83 
• 2 
2 
2 
2 • 
2 
3 
2 
2 
01 : 58 SENATE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · Re covered 
I I I I I 
0 . 5 1 6  1 . 53 1  2 . 547 
0 . 009 1 . 024 2 . 039 
9 6 
True 
0 . 98 1  -
0 . 8 50 -
0 . 720 -
0 . 589 -
0 . 458 -
0 . 327 -
0 . 1 97 -
0 . 066 -
-0 . 06 5  -
-o .  1 96 -
I 
-0. 327 - I  
I 
I 
-0. 457 -
-0. 588 -
- 0 . 7 1 9 -
-0 . 850 -
- 0 . 980 - I  3 
9 
3 
3 
63 
3 33 
3 
Figure 4 :  True and Recovered Midpoints : Perfect Vo t in g  
33 3 3  
3 3 3  3 3 3  
33 
3 3 3  33 
3 
3 
333 
3 3  
6 3 3  
363 
3 
1 7 - Jun-83 
33 3333 63 
33 333 
333 
33 
1 7 : 37 
3 
3 3  
3 3  
3 
336 
3 
3 
63 
36 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 3  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Re covered I I I I I I I I I I I - 1 . 39 1  -0. 856 - 0 . 293 0 . 270 0 . 833 1 . 397 - 1 .  1 38 - 0 . 575 -0 . 0 1 1  0 . 552 1 . 1 1 5 
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Figure 5 :  True and Recovered Midpoints : S t o chas t i c  Vot ing-Run E 
True 
0 . 98 1  - I  
I 
I 
0 . 850 - I  
I 
I 
0 . 720 - I  
I 
I 
0 . 589 - I  
I 
I 
0 . 458 - I  
I 
I 
0 . 327 - I  
I 
I 
0 . 197 - I  
I 
I 
0 . 066 - I 
I 
I 
-0 . 065 - I  
I 
I 
-0. 196 -
-0. 327 -
-0 . 4 57 -
• 2 • • 
23 • 
- 0 . 588 - • • • • 2 • • 3 • 
• • 3 • 22• •  
-o .  7 1 11 -
-0. 850 
-0. 980 
3 
- 1 2  2•3 • 
1 2  • 2  2 •  • 
1 2  • 
- I  • 2 
1 5 - Jun-83 
2 2 
• 22 • • 22 
2 
2 
2 
2 4 • • 
3 • 2 • 44222 • • 2 2 
• 3 • 222 • • •  
• 2 • 3 • •  
• •  • • 2 • 223 • 2 • 
• • 3 
• 322• • 3 .. 
2 • 
1 5 : 26 
2 • 
2 
• 2 
1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Recovered 
I I I I I I I I I I I 
- 1 . 000 -0 . 6 1 6  -0 . 2 1 2  0 . 1 92 0 . 596 1 . 000 
-0 . 8 1 8  -0 . 4 1 4  - 0 . 0 1 0  0 . 394 0. 798 
9 8  
True 
0 . 101 - I  
I 
I 
-0 . 047 _ ,  
I 
I 
-o . 194 - I 
-0. 342 -
-0. 489 -
-0. 637 -
-0. 784 -
- 0 . 932 -
- 1 . 079 -
I 
I 
- 1 . 227 _ ,  
I 
I 
- 1 . 375 _ ,  
I 
I 
- 1 .  522 _ ,  
I 
I 
- 1 . 670 - I  
I 
I 
- 1 . 8 1 7  - I  
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- 1 . 965 - I  
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Figure 6 :  T rue and Recovered Liberal Coordinates : S tochas t i c  Vot ing-Run E 
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2 • 2 
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2 • • 2 
1 5 -Jun-83 1 5 : 26 
• 2 
• 2 
• • • • • • • • • 2 
2 
• • 2 • 22 
• 22• • 2 2 • 
2 • • •  
• 22 • 2 
32 4 
. .. .  3 • •  3 
22 • 32 • 2 
• 3 • • •  2 • •  
3 • 
2 • • • •  
• 2 
. .  
2 
2 • 
22 
- 2 . 1 1 2 - r • 
1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Recovered 
I I I I I I I I ! I I 
- 2 . 890 - 2 . 247 - 1 . 570 -0. 894 -0 . 2 1 7  0 . 460 
- 2 . 586 - 1 . 909 - 1 . 232 -0. 555 0 . 1 2 2  
9 9 
